Files
probo/pkg/server/api/api.go
Bryan Frimin bf255b198c Bound GraphQL request cost to prevent alias-flooding DoS
The GraphQL endpoint built its gqlgen server with bare handler.New and
no limits, so a single request with thousands of aliased resolver calls
was parsed, validated, executed, and marshalled in full. Under load this
let an unauthenticated client drive excessive CPU and memory use against
POST /api/connect/v1/graphql and the console and trust endpoints, which
share the same constructor (GHSA-prh2-g8pv-m7p9).

Add configurable guards in the shared gqlutils.NewHandler: a parser
token limit rejects oversized queries at lex time before any execution,
a fixed complexity limit caps field-selection count, an LRU query cache
avoids repeated parsing, and field suggestions are disabled. The limits
flow from a new APIConfig.GraphQL section through server and api config
into all three GraphQL handlers, with PROBOD_API_GRAPHQL_* env vars and
Helm values exposed for per-environment tuning.

Defaults are sized with generous headroom over real traffic: the parser
token limit (15000) and complexity limit (2000) sit far above the
largest legitimate frontend query yet well below the proof-of-concept
flood, so normal usage is unaffected while floods are rejected cheaply.

Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@probo.com>
2026-06-30 14:10:41 +02:00

318 lines
9.5 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) 2025-2026 Probo Inc <hello@probo.com>.
//
// Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
// purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
// copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
//
// THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH
// REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
// AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT,
// INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM
// LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR
// OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
// PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
package api
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"github.com/go-chi/cors"
"go.gearno.de/kit/httpserver"
"go.gearno.de/kit/log"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/accessreview"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/agentrun"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/baseurl"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/connector"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/connector/provider"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/cookiebanner"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/esign"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/filemanager"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/geoloc"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/iam"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/mailman"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/probo"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/resourcealias"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/riskmanagement"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/securecookie"
connect_v1 "go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/server/api/connect/v1"
console_v1 "go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/server/api/console/v1"
cookiebanner_v1 "go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/server/api/cookiebanner/v1"
files_v1 "go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/server/api/files/v1"
mcp_v1 "go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/server/api/mcp/v1"
slack_v1 "go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/server/api/slack/v1"
trust_v1 "go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/server/api/trust/v1"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/server/gqlutils"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/slack"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/thirdparty"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/trust"
)
type (
Config struct {
BaseURL *baseurl.BaseURL
AllowedOrigins []string
Probo *probo.Service
ResourceAlias *resourcealias.Service
File *filemanager.Service
IAM *iam.Service
Trust *trust.Service
ESign *esign.Service
AccessReview *accessreview.Service
AgentRun *agentrun.Service
Slack *slack.Service
Mailman *mailman.Service
CookieBanner *cookiebanner.Service
Geoloc *geoloc.Service
ThirdParty *thirdparty.Service
RiskManagement *riskmanagement.Service
Cookie securecookie.Config
TokenSecret string
ConnectorRegistry *connector.ConnectorRegistry
ProviderRegistry *provider.Registry
CustomDomainCname string
GraphQLLimits gqlutils.Limits
Logger *log.Logger
}
MCPConfig struct {
Version string
RequestTimeout time.Duration
MaxRequestSize int64
}
Server struct {
cfg Config
csrf *http.CrossOriginProtection
compliancePageHandler http.Handler
consoleHandler http.Handler
cookieBannerHandler http.Handler
filesHandler http.Handler
mcpHandler http.Handler
slackHandler http.Handler
connectHandler http.Handler
}
)
var (
ErrMissingProboService = errors.New("server configuration requires a valid probo.Service instance")
ErrMissingIAMService = errors.New("server configuration requires a valid iam.Service instance")
ErrMissingSlackService = errors.New("server configuration requires a valid slack.Service instance")
)
func methodNotAllowed(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
defer func() { _ = r.Body.Close() }()
httpserver.RenderJSON(
w,
http.StatusMethodNotAllowed,
map[string]string{
"error": "method not allowed",
},
)
}
func notFound(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
defer func() { _ = r.Body.Close() }()
httpserver.RenderJSON(
w,
http.StatusNotFound,
map[string]string{
"error": "not found",
},
)
}
func NewServer(cfg Config) (*Server, error) {
if cfg.Probo == nil {
return nil, ErrMissingProboService
}
if cfg.IAM == nil {
return nil, ErrMissingIAMService
}
if cfg.Slack == nil {
return nil, ErrMissingSlackService
}
csrf := http.NewCrossOriginProtection()
for _, origin := range cfg.AllowedOrigins {
if err := csrf.AddTrustedOrigin(origin); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot add trusted origin %q: %w", origin, err)
}
}
// The SAML Assertion Consumer Service endpoint receives cross-origin
// POSTs from external identity providers by design.
csrf.AddInsecureBypassPattern("POST /connect/v1/saml/2.0/consume")
// The cookie banner API is called cross-origin from customer websites
// by the JS SDK. CORS is handled by the cookie banner middleware.
// GET and OPTIONS are safe methods (always allowed), but we bypass
// POST explicitly since it comes from customer origins.
csrf.AddInsecureBypassPattern("POST /cookie-banner/v1/{rest...}")
// OAuth2 token, introspection, revocation, and device authorization
// endpoints receive cross-origin POSTs from external clients.
csrf.AddInsecureBypassPattern("POST /connect/v1/oauth2/token")
csrf.AddInsecureBypassPattern("POST /connect/v1/oauth2/introspect")
csrf.AddInsecureBypassPattern("POST /connect/v1/oauth2/revoke")
csrf.AddInsecureBypassPattern("POST /connect/v1/oauth2/device")
csrf.SetDenyHandler(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
httpserver.RenderJSON(
w,
http.StatusForbidden,
map[string]string{
"error": "cross-origin request denied",
},
)
}))
return &Server{
cfg: cfg,
csrf: csrf,
compliancePageHandler: trust_v1.NewMux(
cfg.Logger.Named("trust.v1"),
cfg.IAM,
cfg.Trust,
cfg.ResourceAlias,
cfg.File,
cfg.ESign,
cfg.Mailman,
cfg.Cookie,
cfg.TokenSecret,
cfg.BaseURL,
cfg.GraphQLLimits,
),
consoleHandler: console_v1.NewMux(
cfg.Logger.Named("console.v1"),
cfg.Probo,
cfg.ResourceAlias,
cfg.IAM,
cfg.ESign,
cfg.AccessReview,
cfg.AgentRun,
cfg.Mailman,
cfg.CookieBanner,
cfg.Cookie,
cfg.TokenSecret,
cfg.ConnectorRegistry,
cfg.ProviderRegistry,
cfg.File,
cfg.BaseURL,
cfg.CustomDomainCname,
cfg.ThirdParty,
cfg.RiskManagement,
cfg.GraphQLLimits,
),
cookieBannerHandler: cookiebanner_v1.NewMux(
cfg.Logger.Named("cookiebanner.v1"),
cfg.CookieBanner,
cfg.Geoloc,
),
filesHandler: files_v1.NewMux(
cfg.Logger.Named("files.v1"),
cfg.File,
cfg.Probo,
cfg.IAM,
cfg.Cookie,
cfg.TokenSecret,
cfg.BaseURL,
),
mcpHandler: mcp_v1.NewMux(
cfg.Logger.Named("mcp.v1"),
cfg.Probo,
cfg.ResourceAlias,
cfg.ThirdParty,
cfg.IAM,
cfg.AccessReview,
cfg.CookieBanner,
cfg.RiskManagement,
cfg.TokenSecret,
cfg.File,
cfg.BaseURL,
),
slackHandler: slack_v1.NewMux(
cfg.Logger.Named("slack.v1"),
cfg.Slack,
cfg.Trust,
),
connectHandler: connect_v1.NewMux(
cfg.Logger.Named("connect.v1"),
cfg.IAM,
cfg.Cookie,
cfg.TokenSecret,
cfg.File,
cfg.BaseURL,
func(ctx context.Context, host string) bool {
if host == cfg.BaseURL.Host() {
return true
}
_, err := cfg.Trust.GetByDomainName(ctx, host)
return err == nil
},
func(ctx context.Context, host string) bool {
_, err := cfg.Trust.GetByDomainName(ctx, host)
return err == nil
},
cfg.GraphQLLimits,
),
}, nil
}
func (s *Server) CompliancePageHandler() http.Handler {
return s.compliancePageHandler
}
func (s *Server) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
corsOpts := cors.Options{
AllowedOrigins: s.cfg.AllowedOrigins,
AllowedMethods: []string{"GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "HEAD"},
AllowedHeaders: []string{"content-type", "traceparent", "authorization"},
ExposedHeaders: []string{"x-request-id"},
AllowCredentials: true,
MaxAge: 600, // 10 minutes (chrome >= 76 maximum value c.f. https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:services/network/public/cpp/cors/preflight_result.cc;drc=52002151773d8cd9ffc5f557cd7cc880fddcae3e;l=36)
OptionsPassthrough: false,
Debug: false,
}
w.Header().Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
w.Header().Set("X-XSS-Protection", "0")
w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
w.Header().Set("Referrer-Policy", "no-referrer")
w.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'self'")
w.Header().Set("Permissions-Policy", "microphone=(), camera=(), geolocation=()")
router := chi.NewRouter()
router.MethodNotAllowed(methodNotAllowed)
router.NotFound(notFound)
// Cookie banner has its own per-banner CORS middleware; mount it
// outside the global CORS handler so OPTIONS preflights from
// customer websites are not swallowed by the stricter AllowedOrigins
// list that applies to console/connect routes.
router.Mount("/cookie-banner/v1", http.StripPrefix("/cookie-banner/v1", s.cookieBannerHandler))
router.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(cors.Handler(corsOpts))
r.Mount("/console/v1", http.StripPrefix("/console/v1", s.consoleHandler))
r.Mount("/connect/v1", http.StripPrefix("/connect/v1", s.connectHandler))
r.Mount("/files/v1", http.StripPrefix("/files/v1", s.filesHandler))
r.Mount("/trust/v1", http.StripPrefix("/trust/v1", s.compliancePageHandler))
r.Mount("/mcp/v1", http.StripPrefix("/mcp/v1", s.mcpHandler))
r.Mount("/slack/v1", http.StripPrefix("/slack/v1", s.slackHandler))
})
s.csrf.Handler(router).ServeHTTP(w, r)
}