Build the public Updates pages in the compliance portal: a
cursor-paginated list of sent mailing-list updates and a detail view
for a single update, replacing the previous stub page.
Add a MailingListUpdate case to the trust API node resolver, guarded so
only SENT updates belonging to the current trust center's mailing list
are exposed, so the detail page can load an update by URL.
Add a Prev/Next Pagination primitive to the v2 UI kit. Page numbers are
omitted because cursor pagination cannot derive an ordinal page index;
each arrow only shows when its page exists while keeping its slot
reserved so a visible arrow never shifts position.
Relocate the shared MailingListUpdateListItem to its own component
folder and wrap each row in a link to the detail page, so both the home
recent-updates section and the list navigate to detail.
Signed-off-by: Émile Ré <emile@probo.com>
Address the review comments on the subprocessors work:
- Reject invalid category/country filter values in the Subprocessors
resolver with an INVALID error instead of relying solely on transport
coercion, so a malformed request fails fast and explicitly.
- Use pgx.StrictNamedArgs in the new distinct facet queries so missing
or extra SQL placeholders stay detectable, matching sibling queries.
- Default a nil ThirdPartyFilter at the service boundary to avoid a nil
dereference in the coredata list/count paths.
- Expose the category group label as an aria heading for assistive tech.
- Add the missing space in the Select "Selected:" story label.
Signed-off-by: Émile Ré <emile@probo.com>
The subprocessors toolbar derived its category and region filter
options client-side from a second, unfiltered subprocessors(first: 250)
fetch, shipping up to 250 rows purely to compute two small facet sets
and silently capping the options at that limit.
Expose subprocessorCategories and subprocessorCountries on TrustCenter,
each backed by a DISTINCT query over the organization's third parties
scoped to show_on_trust_center, and read them directly in the toolbar.
The page now issues one filtered list query plus two tiny arrays, and
the options only ever include values that can actually return results.
Signed-off-by: Émile Ré <emile@probo.com>
Subprocessor filtering for the compliance portal happens in the backend
rather than the client. Add a SubprocessorFilter (query, category,
country) to the trust API's subprocessors connection, thread it through
the resolver and service, and extend the coredata ThirdParty filter with
category equality and country array membership. The connection stores the
filter so totalCount reflects the filtered set. Add e2e coverage for the
new filtering.
On the frontend, convert the page to a refetchable fragment whose filter
arguments are driven by URL-persisted, debounced toolbar state (category
and region selects plus a search field), populate the dropdowns from an
unfiltered facet selection, and offer to clear filters from the empty
state.
Signed-off-by: Émile Ré <emile@probo.com>
Any self-provisioned trust center visitor could accept another
visitor's NDA signature or inject audit-trail events into it by
supplying its GID, since AcceptSignature and RecordEvent trusted the
client-supplied signature ID without checking it belonged to the
caller (GHSA-22xj-f767-ppw6). SignerEmail/ActorEmail are always
derived from the verified session identity, never client input, so
comparing them against the signature's stored SignerEmail in
pkg/esign/service.go closes the hole at its root without touching the
resolver-level authorization already in place elsewhere.
Adds an e2e regression test that self-provisions two trust center
visitors through the real magic-link flow and confirms one cannot
touch the other's signature.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@probo.com>
Drop the redundant embedded Resolver selector flagged by staticcheck
(QF1008) in the membership and organization permission resolvers, and
add the whitespace wsl_v5 expects around the attribute range loop and
the final return in permission.
Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
Replace the deny-based restriction on granting OWNER with role-scoped
allow policies so authorization fails closed: admins may create and
update memberships only when the assigned role is not OWNER, and the
absence of a target role no longer implies permission.
To keep console UI gating accurate without loosening the base grants,
the permission field gains an optional typed options argument
(PermissionOptionsInput) that forwards target_role into the dry-run
authorization. Only the two role-related console calls (create user,
update membership) pass it; the OWNER option stays hidden for admins via
the existing assignable-roles helper.
Add a non-regression test that an admin cannot promote a member to OWNER
while still being able to change members between non-owner roles.
An organization ADMIN could hard-remove members, including OWNERs, because
removeUser (connect and MCP) only checked the weaker iam:membership-profile:delete
gate. Authorize the owner-only iam:membership:delete instead, and expose the
source attribute on MembershipProfile so the owner grant's non-SCIM condition
can match.
Consolidate ownership-grant authorization into policy for both createUser and
updateMembership: each resolver passes the requested role as a target_role
attribute and ADMIN is denied granting ownership via deny-create-owner /
deny-promote-owner. target_role is distinct from resource.role, which is the
target's current role and guards editing existing owners. With no callers left,
the iam:membership-role:set-owner action (grant and OAuth2 scope) is removed.
Also pass the authorized scope through to the RemoveUser/CreateUser services,
gate the console Remove action on iam:membership:delete, and add regression
tests plus a changelog entry.
Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
The third-party vetting agent runs a suite of HTTP "security" tools on
the internal worker network against a caller-supplied URL that is only
validated for length and charset, not host. Several tools reached
internal, loopback, and link-local addresses:
- analyze_csp used a bare http.Client with no host validation, no
redirect control, and no rebinding-safe transport, reflecting the
target's CSP header back to the caller.
- check_security_headers, fetch_robots_txt, and fetch_sitemap
validated only the initial host, then followed 3xx redirects with an
ordinary client, yielding full-read SSRF via a redirect to an
internal address.
- check_cors validated the URL but still dialed through an ordinary
transport, leaving it exposed to DNS-rebinding TOCTOU.
Route every one of these clients through the house-standard
httpclient.DefaultPooledClient(WithSSRFProtection()), which rejects
dials to loopback, private, CGNAT, link-local, ULA, IPv4-mapped, and
reserved ranges on the resolved peer IP at connect time (defeating DNS
rebinding on every redirect hop) and refuses cross-origin redirects.
download_pdf moves onto the same client, and the now-unused local
netcheck.NewPinnedTransport is removed. analyze_csp also gains an
up-front ValidatePublicURL check for a clean early error and scheme
enforcement.
Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
The DocumentVersionSignatureFilter exposed a field named `state` that
actually filters on the signatory's profile state, which was ambiguous
next to the signature `states` field. Rename it to `profileState`
(GraphQL) / `profile_state` (MCP) across the schema, spec, resolvers,
console app, and n8n node for clarity.
Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
Normalize Anthropic thinking budgets while building message parameters so budget_tokens stays below max_tokens with response headroom. When the configured max token budget is too small to support Anthropic's minimum thinking budget, omit thinking for that request instead of sending an invalid payload.
Signed-off-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Sacha Al Himdani <SachaProbo@users.noreply.github.com>
The public trust API derived its authorization scope from client-supplied
global IDs, so a visitor on one trust center could resolve nodes, export
audit-report PDFs, and read or mutate electronic signatures belonging to
another organization (cross-tenant access).
Every trust API resolver now derives its scope from the active compliance
page's organization via compliancepage.ScopeFromContext, so reads are always
confined to the page's tenant. Cross-tenant or unknown IDs surface as
not-found instead of leaking data or returning a 500. Active/presence is
enforced upstream by the id and presence middlewares.
esign's signature operations (GetSignatureByID, AcceptSignature, RecordEvent)
now take a caller-provided scope instead of deriving one from the requested
ID, so signature reads and mutations are tenant-scoped at the source. This
removes the need for a resolver-level authorization helper; RecordEvent also
verifies signature ownership within scope before recording, since the event
foreign key is not tenant-composite.
Adds e2e non-regression tests covering owning vs. foreign trust center report
export and the generic node(id:) resolver.
Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
The available document access list backing Grant All included documents
whose trust center visibility is PRIVATE but that have no published
version. Require a published major so the grantable set matches the
request-all filter and the Slack notification, which already skip drafts
and hidden documents.
Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
The trust center access-request Slack notification listed every document
referenced by a document access, including drafts with no published
version and documents whose trust center visibility is NONE. Skip those
so the message only surfaces documents a requester could actually be
granted.
Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
Several HTTP entry points still parsed RemoteAddr directly, so behind
a layer-7 proxy they recorded the load balancer IP instead of the
signer's. Route NDA acceptance, signing events, document sign/approve,
and session updates through clientip.Extract, which honors Forwarded
and X-Forwarded-For when trustedproxy allows them.
Signed-off-by: Ludovic Vielle <ludovic@probo.com>
An organization ADMIN could mint an OWNER membership via createUser, which
only gated iam:membership-profile:create and bypassed the owner-only
iam:membership-role:set-owner check that updateMembership already enforces.
Gate the requested role in both createUser entry points (connect resolver
and the MCP CreateUserTool) with an additional set-owner authorization when
the role is OWNER, mirroring updateMembership. Add a regression test that
locks the ADMIN/OWNER privilege boundary the fix relies on.
Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
The CLI still defaulted to *.console.getprobo.com for region
selection, examples, and the non-interactive fallback host. Align
those with the current SaaS hostnames so new logins store the right
config keys.
Signed-off-by: Ludovic Vielle <ludovic@probo.com>
Third-party compliance report PDFs were rejected above 10MB in the
upload dialog. Increase the client-side Dropzone limit and enforce the
same cap on the backend file validator.
Signed-off-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Bryan FRIMIN <bryan@frimin.fr>
Add a resource-oriented set of webhook events for the document
lifecycle. Each event carries the document plus only the sub-resource
it concerns (version, signature or approval).
Events:
- document.created / updated / archived / unarchived / deleted
- document.version.created / updated / published / rejected / deleted
- document.version.signature.requested / signed / cancelled
- document.version.approval.requested / approved / rejected / voided
Wires the new types through the migration, Go enum, GraphQL schema,
CLI, n8n nodes and the console webhooks settings UI.
Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
The n8n package could already manage webhook subscriptions through API
CRUD, but had no way to start a workflow when Probo emitted an event. A
user had to drop in the generic Webhook node, create a subscription by
hand, and verify the HMAC signature themselves.
Add a ProboTrigger node that owns the subscription lifecycle: it creates
the subscription on activation pointing at n8n's generated webhook URL,
re-checks and re-registers it if the URL drifts, and deletes it on
deactivation. The webhook handler recomputes the HMAC-SHA256 over the raw
request body and compares it constant-time against the delivered
signature, failing closed when the bytes or headers are absent.
Drop the MEETING_* event choices from the webhook create and update
operations and the CLI event list. They are not part of the backend
WebhookEventType enum, so selecting them only produced API rejections.
Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
probod-bootstrap was writing empty strings and stub blocks such as
`esign: {}` into generated YAML. The post-marshal prune pass caused
part of that by stripping empty leaf strings while leaving empty
parent maps behind.
Drop the prune round-trip in WriteConfig and rely on struct-level
omitzero/omitempty tags plus custom IsZero() helpers on probodconfig.
Only include LLM providers when an API key is set, use a nil map for
extra API headers, and extend the dev-config Makefile recipe with the
local dev defaults already documented in .env.example.
Config loading is unchanged: omitted keys still decode to Go zero
values.
Signed-off-by: Ludovic Vielle <ludovic@probo.com>
probod-bootstrap was repeating probod.New() literals for string
env vars. Map those fields with getEnv only and leave int and bool
defaults in the builder. Runtime and generated yaml pick up probod
defaults when a variable is unset; dev and Helm still set env vars
explicitly where needed.
Signed-off-by: Ludovic Vielle <ludovic@probo.com>
Native OAuth clients such as Claude Code publish loopback redirect URIs
without a port (http://localhost/callback) and pick an ephemeral port at
request time, as described in RFC 8252 section 7.3. The authorize flow
matched the requested redirect URI against the registered set with an
exact string comparison, so http://localhost:3118/callback was rejected
with invalid_redirect_uri even for a trusted, allow-listed client.
Make OAuth2Client.IsRedirectURIAllowed the single source of truth for
redirect matching: it keeps exact matching and adds loopback-aware
matching that ignores the port when scheme, host, path, and query agree.
The redundant document-level check and its duplicate loopback helper in
the CIMD resolver are removed, so both the registered-client and CIMD
paths now rely on one matcher.
Also add a pkg/netx package for the loopback helper.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@probo.com>
Expand buildRiskAssessmentNotes to persist most of the extracted
assessment (classification, per-category risk breakdown, privacy and
data processing practices, AI governance, contractual clauses,
professional standing, and baseline failures) instead of only a short
summary. Fields already stored as structured columns on the third party
(certifications, data locations, document URLs) are omitted to avoid
duplication.
Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
Deleting a profile still referenced elsewhere (for example as an
asset owner) surfaced an internal error. PostgreSQL reports ON DELETE
RESTRICT blocks as SQLSTATE 23001, not 23503; map both in profile
delete and propagate ErrProfileInUse through removeUser as CONFLICT.
Signed-off-by: Ludovic Vielle <ludovic@probo.com>
The GraphQL endpoint built its gqlgen server with bare handler.New and
no limits, so a single request with thousands of aliased resolver calls
was parsed, validated, executed, and marshalled in full. Under load this
let an unauthenticated client drive excessive CPU and memory use against
POST /api/connect/v1/graphql and the console and trust endpoints, which
share the same constructor (GHSA-prh2-g8pv-m7p9).
Add configurable guards in the shared gqlutils.NewHandler: a parser
token limit rejects oversized queries at lex time before any execution,
a fixed complexity limit caps field-selection count, an LRU query cache
avoids repeated parsing, and field suggestions are disabled. The limits
flow from a new APIConfig.GraphQL section through server and api config
into all three GraphQL handlers, with PROBOD_API_GRAPHQL_* env vars and
Helm values exposed for per-environment tuning.
Defaults are sized with generous headroom over real traffic: the parser
token limit (15000) and complexity limit (2000) sit far above the
largest legitimate frontend query yet well below the proof-of-concept
flood, so normal usage is unaffected while floods are rejected cheaply.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@probo.com>
Replace the custom polling loop in the Slack sender with the
go.gearno.de/kit/worker framework, matching the email sending worker.
Add a processing_started_at column to slack_messages so claims are safe
under the worker's claim/process model, with stale recovery for crashed
in-flight sends. Rename sender.go to worker.go to match the kit worker
file naming convention.
Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
probod-bootstrap could only resolve aws:// Secrets Manager refs.
Add awsps:// for SSM Parameter Store (GetParameter with decryption)
and awssm:// as an explicit Secrets Manager prefix. Keep aws:// for
backward compatibility. Values are cached per run per backend.
Update Helm, .env.example, and probod-bootstrap changelog.
Signed-off-by: Ludovic Vielle <ludovic@probo.com>
Convert the hand-rolled webhook Sender loop into a kit worker.Handler so
the sender gets the standard worker recovery, metrics and tracing
instead. Claim loads the next unprocessed webhook data and Process
performs the deliveries; behaviour is preserved with a single-concurrency
worker on the existing poll interval.
Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
