Local Vite continue URLs use absolute localhost origins that never pass verified custom-domain checks. Reuse AllowedOrigins so post-auth redirects work in dev without disabling Validate. Signed-off-by: Émile Ré <emile@probo.com>
160 lines
4.2 KiB
Go
160 lines
4.2 KiB
Go
// Copyright (c) 2025-2026 Probo Inc <hello@probo.com>.
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//
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// Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
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// of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
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// in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
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// to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
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// copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
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// furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
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//
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// The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
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// all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
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//
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// THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
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// IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
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// FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
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// AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
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// LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
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// OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
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// SOFTWARE.
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package saferedirect
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import (
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"context"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"path"
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"strings"
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)
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type (
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AllowedHostFunc func(ctx context.Context, host string) bool
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SafeRedirect struct {
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allowedHost AllowedHostFunc
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}
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)
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func New(allowedHost AllowedHostFunc) *SafeRedirect {
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return &SafeRedirect{allowedHost: allowedHost}
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}
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// StaticHosts returns an AllowedHost function that matches against a fixed
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// list of hosts.
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func StaticHosts(hosts ...string) AllowedHostFunc {
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allowed := make(map[string]bool, len(hosts))
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for _, h := range hosts {
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if h != "" {
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allowed[h] = true
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}
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}
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return func(_ context.Context, host string) bool {
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return allowed[host]
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}
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}
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// Origins returns an AllowedHost function that matches hosts extracted from
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// absolute origin URLs (for example CORS allowed-origins). Invalid or empty
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// origins are ignored. The host includes the port when present.
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func Origins(origins ...string) AllowedHostFunc {
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hosts := make([]string, 0, len(origins))
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for _, origin := range origins {
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parsed, err := url.Parse(origin)
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if err != nil || parsed.Host == "" {
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continue
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}
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hosts = append(hosts, parsed.Host)
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}
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return StaticHosts(hosts...)
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}
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// Any returns an AllowedHost function that allows a host when any of the
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// provided functions allow it. Nil functions are skipped.
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func Any(fns ...AllowedHostFunc) AllowedHostFunc {
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return func(ctx context.Context, host string) bool {
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for _, fn := range fns {
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if fn != nil && fn(ctx, host) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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}
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func (sr *SafeRedirect) Validate(ctx context.Context, redirectURL string) (string, bool) {
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if redirectURL == "" {
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return "", false
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}
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if strings.HasPrefix(redirectURL, "/") {
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safePath, ok := normalizeRelativePath(redirectURL)
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if !ok {
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return "", false
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}
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return safePath, true
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}
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parsedURL, err := url.Parse(redirectURL)
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if err != nil {
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return "", false
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}
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if parsedURL.IsAbs() {
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if parsedURL.Scheme != "http" && parsedURL.Scheme != "https" {
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return "", false
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}
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if sr.allowedHost != nil && !sr.allowedHost(ctx, parsedURL.Host) {
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return "", false
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}
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return redirectURL, true
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}
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return "", false
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}
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func (sr *SafeRedirect) GetSafeRedirectURL(ctx context.Context, redirectURL, fallbackURL string) string {
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if safeURL, isValid := sr.Validate(ctx, redirectURL); isValid {
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return safeURL
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}
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return fallbackURL
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}
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func (sr *SafeRedirect) Redirect(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, redirectURL, fallbackURL string, statusCode int) {
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safeURL := sr.GetSafeRedirectURL(r.Context(), redirectURL, fallbackURL)
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http.Redirect(w, r, safeURL, statusCode)
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}
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func normalizeRelativePath(redirectURL string) (string, bool) {
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if strings.HasPrefix(redirectURL, "//") {
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return "", false
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}
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if strings.Contains(redirectURL, `\`) || strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(redirectURL), "%5c") {
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return "", false
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}
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cleaned := path.Clean(redirectURL)
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if !strings.HasPrefix(cleaned, "/") {
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return "", false
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}
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if len(cleaned) > 1 && (cleaned[1] == '/' || cleaned[1] == '\\') {
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return "", false
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}
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if strings.Contains(cleaned, `\`) {
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return "", false
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}
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return cleaned, true
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}
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