Files
probo/pkg/agent/tools/security/csp.go
Sacha Al Himdani 98f08b7439 Guard vetting agent HTTP tools against SSRF
The third-party vetting agent runs a suite of HTTP "security" tools on
the internal worker network against a caller-supplied URL that is only
validated for length and charset, not host. Several tools reached
internal, loopback, and link-local addresses:

  - analyze_csp used a bare http.Client with no host validation, no
    redirect control, and no rebinding-safe transport, reflecting the
    target's CSP header back to the caller.
  - check_security_headers, fetch_robots_txt, and fetch_sitemap
    validated only the initial host, then followed 3xx redirects with an
    ordinary client, yielding full-read SSRF via a redirect to an
    internal address.
  - check_cors validated the URL but still dialed through an ordinary
    transport, leaving it exposed to DNS-rebinding TOCTOU.

Route every one of these clients through the house-standard
httpclient.DefaultPooledClient(WithSSRFProtection()), which rejects
dials to loopback, private, CGNAT, link-local, ULA, IPv4-mapped, and
reserved ranges on the resolved peer IP at connect time (defeating DNS
rebinding on every redirect hop) and refuses cross-origin redirects.
download_pdf moves onto the same client, and the now-unused local
netcheck.NewPinnedTransport is removed. analyze_csp also gains an
up-front ValidatePublicURL check for a clean early error and scheme
enforcement.

Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
2026-07-08 11:23:00 +02:00

158 lines
4.1 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) 2026 Probo Inc <hello@probo.com>.
//
// Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
// purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
// copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
//
// THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH
// REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
// AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT,
// INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM
// LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR
// OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
// PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
package security
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
"go.gearno.de/kit/httpclient"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/agent"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/agent/tools/internal/netcheck"
)
type (
cspParams struct {
URL string `json:"url" jsonschema:"The URL to analyze the Content-Security-Policy header for"`
}
cspDirective struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Values []string `json:"values"`
}
cspResult struct {
Present bool `json:"present"`
ReportOnly bool `json:"report_only"`
RawHeader string `json:"raw_header,omitempty"`
Directives []cspDirective `json:"directives,omitempty"`
HasUnsafeEval bool `json:"has_unsafe_eval"`
HasUnsafeInline bool `json:"has_unsafe_inline"`
HasWildcard bool `json:"has_wildcard"`
ErrorDetail string `json:"error_detail,omitempty"`
}
)
func parseCSPDirectives(raw string) []cspDirective {
var directives []cspDirective
for part := range strings.SplitSeq(raw, ";") {
part = strings.TrimSpace(part)
if part == "" {
continue
}
tokens := strings.Fields(part)
if len(tokens) == 0 {
continue
}
directives = append(
directives,
cspDirective{
Name: tokens[0],
Values: tokens[1:],
},
)
}
return directives
}
func AnalyzeCSPTool() agent.Tool {
client := httpclient.DefaultPooledClient(httpclient.WithSSRFProtection())
client.Timeout = 10 * time.Second
return agent.FunctionTool(
"analyze_csp",
"Analyze the Content-Security-Policy header for a URL, parsing directives and flagging unsafe patterns like unsafe-eval, unsafe-inline, and wildcard sources.",
func(ctx context.Context, p cspParams) (agent.ToolResult, error) {
if err := netcheck.ValidatePublicURL(p.URL); err != nil {
return agent.ResultJSON(
cspResult{
ErrorDetail: fmt.Sprintf("URL not allowed: %s", err),
},
), nil
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, p.URL, nil)
if err != nil {
return agent.ResultJSON(
cspResult{
ErrorDetail: fmt.Sprintf("cannot create request for %s: %s", p.URL, err),
},
), nil
}
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return agent.ResultJSON(
cspResult{
ErrorDetail: fmt.Sprintf("cannot fetch %s: %s", p.URL, err),
},
), nil
}
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
raw := resp.Header.Get("Content-Security-Policy")
reportOnly := false
if raw == "" {
raw = resp.Header.Get("Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only")
if raw != "" {
reportOnly = true
}
}
if raw == "" {
return agent.ResultJSON(cspResult{Present: false}), nil
}
directives := parseCSPDirectives(raw)
var hasUnsafeEval, hasUnsafeInline, hasWildcard bool
for _, d := range directives {
for _, v := range d.Values {
switch v {
case "'unsafe-eval'":
hasUnsafeEval = true
case "'unsafe-inline'":
hasUnsafeInline = true
case "*":
hasWildcard = true
}
}
}
result := cspResult{
Present: true,
ReportOnly: reportOnly,
RawHeader: raw,
Directives: directives,
HasUnsafeEval: hasUnsafeEval,
HasUnsafeInline: hasUnsafeInline,
HasWildcard: hasWildcard,
}
return agent.ResultJSON(result), nil
},
)
}