Files
probo/pkg/agent/tools/security/cors.go
Sacha Al Himdani 98f08b7439 Guard vetting agent HTTP tools against SSRF
The third-party vetting agent runs a suite of HTTP "security" tools on
the internal worker network against a caller-supplied URL that is only
validated for length and charset, not host. Several tools reached
internal, loopback, and link-local addresses:

  - analyze_csp used a bare http.Client with no host validation, no
    redirect control, and no rebinding-safe transport, reflecting the
    target's CSP header back to the caller.
  - check_security_headers, fetch_robots_txt, and fetch_sitemap
    validated only the initial host, then followed 3xx redirects with an
    ordinary client, yielding full-read SSRF via a redirect to an
    internal address.
  - check_cors validated the URL but still dialed through an ordinary
    transport, leaving it exposed to DNS-rebinding TOCTOU.

Route every one of these clients through the house-standard
httpclient.DefaultPooledClient(WithSSRFProtection()), which rejects
dials to loopback, private, CGNAT, link-local, ULA, IPv4-mapped, and
reserved ranges on the resolved peer IP at connect time (defeating DNS
rebinding on every redirect hop) and refuses cross-origin redirects.
download_pdf moves onto the same client, and the now-unused local
netcheck.NewPinnedTransport is removed. analyze_csp also gains an
up-front ValidatePublicURL check for a clean early error and scheme
enforcement.

Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
2026-07-08 11:23:00 +02:00

130 lines
4.1 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) 2026 Probo Inc <hello@probo.com>.
//
// Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
// purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
// copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
//
// THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH
// REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
// AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT,
// INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM
// LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR
// OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
// PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
package security
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
"go.gearno.de/kit/httpclient"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/agent"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/agent/tools/internal/netcheck"
)
type (
corsParams struct {
URL string `json:"url" jsonschema:"The URL to check CORS headers for"`
Origin string `json:"origin" jsonschema:"The Origin header value to send in the preflight request (e.g. https://evil.com)"`
}
corsResult struct {
AllowOrigin string `json:"access_control_allow_origin,omitempty"`
AllowMethods []string `json:"access_control_allow_methods,omitempty"`
AllowHeaders []string `json:"access_control_allow_headers,omitempty"`
AllowCredentials bool `json:"access_control_allow_credentials"`
ExposeHeaders []string `json:"access_control_expose_headers,omitempty"`
MaxAge string `json:"access_control_max_age,omitempty"`
WildcardOrigin bool `json:"wildcard_origin"`
ReflectsOrigin bool `json:"reflects_origin"`
ErrorDetail string `json:"error_detail,omitempty"`
}
)
func splitTrimmed(s, sep string) []string {
if s == "" {
return nil
}
parts := strings.Split(s, sep)
out := make([]string, 0, len(parts))
for _, p := range parts {
p = strings.TrimSpace(p)
if p != "" {
out = append(out, p)
}
}
return out
}
func CheckCORSTool() agent.Tool {
client := httpclient.DefaultPooledClient(httpclient.WithSSRFProtection())
client.Timeout = 10 * time.Second
client.CheckRedirect = func(_ *http.Request, _ []*http.Request) error {
return http.ErrUseLastResponse
}
return agent.FunctionTool(
"check_cors",
"Send a CORS preflight (OPTIONS) request to a URL with a given Origin and analyze the Access-Control-* response headers, flagging wildcard origins and origin reflection.",
func(ctx context.Context, p corsParams) (agent.ToolResult, error) {
if err := netcheck.ValidatePublicURL(p.URL); err != nil {
return agent.ResultJSON(
corsResult{
ErrorDetail: fmt.Sprintf("URL not allowed: %s", err),
},
), nil
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(
ctx,
http.MethodOptions,
p.URL,
nil,
)
if err != nil {
return agent.ResultJSON(
corsResult{
ErrorDetail: fmt.Sprintf("cannot build request: %s", err),
},
), nil
}
req.Header.Set("Origin", p.Origin)
req.Header.Set("Access-Control-Request-Method", "GET")
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return agent.ResultJSON(
corsResult{
ErrorDetail: fmt.Sprintf("cannot fetch %s: %s", p.URL, err),
},
), nil
}
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
allowOrigin := resp.Header.Get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin")
result := corsResult{
AllowOrigin: allowOrigin,
AllowMethods: splitTrimmed(resp.Header.Get("Access-Control-Allow-Methods"), ","),
AllowHeaders: splitTrimmed(resp.Header.Get("Access-Control-Allow-Headers"), ","),
AllowCredentials: strings.EqualFold(resp.Header.Get("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials"), "true"),
ExposeHeaders: splitTrimmed(resp.Header.Get("Access-Control-Expose-Headers"), ","),
MaxAge: resp.Header.Get("Access-Control-Max-Age"),
WildcardOrigin: allowOrigin == "*",
ReflectsOrigin: p.Origin != "" && allowOrigin == p.Origin,
}
return agent.ResultJSON(result), nil
},
)
}