The third-party vetting agent runs a suite of HTTP "security" tools on
the internal worker network against a caller-supplied URL that is only
validated for length and charset, not host. Several tools reached
internal, loopback, and link-local addresses:
- analyze_csp used a bare http.Client with no host validation, no
redirect control, and no rebinding-safe transport, reflecting the
target's CSP header back to the caller.
- check_security_headers, fetch_robots_txt, and fetch_sitemap
validated only the initial host, then followed 3xx redirects with an
ordinary client, yielding full-read SSRF via a redirect to an
internal address.
- check_cors validated the URL but still dialed through an ordinary
transport, leaving it exposed to DNS-rebinding TOCTOU.
Route every one of these clients through the house-standard
httpclient.DefaultPooledClient(WithSSRFProtection()), which rejects
dials to loopback, private, CGNAT, link-local, ULA, IPv4-mapped, and
reserved ranges on the resolved peer IP at connect time (defeating DNS
rebinding on every redirect hop) and refuses cross-origin redirects.
download_pdf moves onto the same client, and the now-unused local
netcheck.NewPinnedTransport is removed. analyze_csp also gains an
up-front ValidatePublicURL check for a clean early error and scheme
enforcement.
Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
158 lines
4.1 KiB
Go
158 lines
4.1 KiB
Go
// Copyright (c) 2026 Probo Inc <hello@probo.com>.
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//
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// Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
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// purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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// copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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//
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// THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH
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// REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
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// AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT,
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// INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM
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// LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR
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// OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
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// PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
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package security
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"go.gearno.de/kit/httpclient"
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"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/agent"
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"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/agent/tools/internal/netcheck"
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)
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type (
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cspParams struct {
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URL string `json:"url" jsonschema:"The URL to analyze the Content-Security-Policy header for"`
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}
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cspDirective struct {
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Name string `json:"name"`
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Values []string `json:"values"`
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}
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cspResult struct {
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Present bool `json:"present"`
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ReportOnly bool `json:"report_only"`
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RawHeader string `json:"raw_header,omitempty"`
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Directives []cspDirective `json:"directives,omitempty"`
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HasUnsafeEval bool `json:"has_unsafe_eval"`
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HasUnsafeInline bool `json:"has_unsafe_inline"`
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HasWildcard bool `json:"has_wildcard"`
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ErrorDetail string `json:"error_detail,omitempty"`
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}
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)
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func parseCSPDirectives(raw string) []cspDirective {
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var directives []cspDirective
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for part := range strings.SplitSeq(raw, ";") {
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part = strings.TrimSpace(part)
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if part == "" {
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continue
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}
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tokens := strings.Fields(part)
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if len(tokens) == 0 {
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continue
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}
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directives = append(
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directives,
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cspDirective{
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Name: tokens[0],
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Values: tokens[1:],
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},
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)
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}
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return directives
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}
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func AnalyzeCSPTool() agent.Tool {
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client := httpclient.DefaultPooledClient(httpclient.WithSSRFProtection())
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client.Timeout = 10 * time.Second
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return agent.FunctionTool(
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"analyze_csp",
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"Analyze the Content-Security-Policy header for a URL, parsing directives and flagging unsafe patterns like unsafe-eval, unsafe-inline, and wildcard sources.",
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func(ctx context.Context, p cspParams) (agent.ToolResult, error) {
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if err := netcheck.ValidatePublicURL(p.URL); err != nil {
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return agent.ResultJSON(
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cspResult{
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ErrorDetail: fmt.Sprintf("URL not allowed: %s", err),
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},
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), nil
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}
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, p.URL, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return agent.ResultJSON(
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cspResult{
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ErrorDetail: fmt.Sprintf("cannot create request for %s: %s", p.URL, err),
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},
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), nil
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}
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resp, err := client.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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return agent.ResultJSON(
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cspResult{
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ErrorDetail: fmt.Sprintf("cannot fetch %s: %s", p.URL, err),
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},
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), nil
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}
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defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
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raw := resp.Header.Get("Content-Security-Policy")
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reportOnly := false
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if raw == "" {
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raw = resp.Header.Get("Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only")
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if raw != "" {
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reportOnly = true
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}
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}
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if raw == "" {
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return agent.ResultJSON(cspResult{Present: false}), nil
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}
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directives := parseCSPDirectives(raw)
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var hasUnsafeEval, hasUnsafeInline, hasWildcard bool
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for _, d := range directives {
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for _, v := range d.Values {
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switch v {
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case "'unsafe-eval'":
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hasUnsafeEval = true
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case "'unsafe-inline'":
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hasUnsafeInline = true
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case "*":
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hasWildcard = true
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}
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}
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}
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result := cspResult{
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Present: true,
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ReportOnly: reportOnly,
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RawHeader: raw,
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Directives: directives,
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HasUnsafeEval: hasUnsafeEval,
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HasUnsafeInline: hasUnsafeInline,
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HasWildcard: hasWildcard,
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}
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return agent.ResultJSON(result), nil
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},
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)
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}
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