Introduce a hierarchical risk assessment model with six entity types: - Risk Assessment: top-level container scoped to an organization - Risk Assessment Scope: sub-container for scoping threat modeling exercises within an assessment - Risk Assessment Node: DFD elements typed as ENTITY, BOUNDARY, ASSET, or DATA within a scope - Risk Assessment Process: directed data flows between two nodes - Risk Assessment Threat: descriptive threats attached to a process with a free-text category (e.g. Confidentiality, Integrity) - Risk Scenario: thin join linking a threat to a risk from the register, carrying only a name and description Risk scoring (likelihood, impact, treatment) remains on the existing Risk entity. Threats are purely descriptive. Risk Scenarios connect the threat model to the risk register without duplicating scores. Backend: migration with PG enum for node types, coredata structs, service layer with full CRUD and validation, GraphQL schema with 18 mutations and paginated connections, authorization actions and policies, and base_resolvers.go Node dispatch for all entity types. Frontend: Risk Assessments list page with create dialog, detail page showing scopes as cards with nodes/processes/threats tables, inline create/edit/delete actions on all entities, and a Scenarios tab on the Risk detail page linking threats to risks. Existing RiskGraph.ts hook file removed in favor of colocated queries in page files. E2E tests cover CRUD for all entity types, RBAC, and tenant isolation. Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@getprobo.com>
289 lines
8.8 KiB
Go
289 lines
8.8 KiB
Go
// Copyright (c) 2025-2026 Probo Inc <hello@getprobo.com>.
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//
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// Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
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// purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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// copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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//
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// THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH
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// REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
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// AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT,
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// INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM
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// LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR
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// OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
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// PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
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package api
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"time"
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"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
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"github.com/go-chi/cors"
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"go.gearno.de/kit/httpserver"
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"go.gearno.de/kit/log"
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"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/accessreview"
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"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/baseurl"
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"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/connector"
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"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/cookiebanner"
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"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/esign"
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"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/file"
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"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/geoloc"
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"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/iam"
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"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/mailman"
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"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/probo"
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"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/riskmanagement"
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"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/securecookie"
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connect_v1 "go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/server/api/connect/v1"
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console_v1 "go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/server/api/console/v1"
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cookiebanner_v1 "go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/server/api/cookiebanner/v1"
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files_v1 "go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/server/api/files/v1"
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mcp_v1 "go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/server/api/mcp/v1"
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slack_v1 "go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/server/api/slack/v1"
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trust_v1 "go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/server/api/trust/v1"
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"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/slack"
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"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/thirdparty"
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"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/trust"
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)
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type (
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Config struct {
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BaseURL *baseurl.BaseURL
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AllowedOrigins []string
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Probo *probo.Service
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File *file.Service
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IAM *iam.Service
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Trust *trust.Service
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ESign *esign.Service
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AccessReview *accessreview.Service
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Slack *slack.Service
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Mailman *mailman.Service
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CookieBanner *cookiebanner.Service
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Geoloc *geoloc.Service
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ThirdParty *thirdparty.Service
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RiskManagement *riskmanagement.Service
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Cookie securecookie.Config
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TokenSecret string
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ConnectorRegistry *connector.ConnectorRegistry
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CustomDomainCname string
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Logger *log.Logger
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}
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MCPConfig struct {
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Version string
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RequestTimeout time.Duration
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MaxRequestSize int64
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}
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Server struct {
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cfg Config
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csrf *http.CrossOriginProtection
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compliancePageHandler http.Handler
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consoleHandler http.Handler
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cookieBannerHandler http.Handler
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filesHandler http.Handler
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mcpHandler http.Handler
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slackHandler http.Handler
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connectHandler http.Handler
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}
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)
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var (
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ErrMissingProboService = errors.New("server configuration requires a valid probo.Service instance")
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ErrMissingIAMService = errors.New("server configuration requires a valid iam.Service instance")
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ErrMissingSlackService = errors.New("server configuration requires a valid slack.Service instance")
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)
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func methodNotAllowed(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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defer func() { _ = r.Body.Close() }()
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httpserver.RenderJSON(
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w,
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http.StatusMethodNotAllowed,
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map[string]string{
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"error": "method not allowed",
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},
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)
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}
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func notFound(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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defer func() { _ = r.Body.Close() }()
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httpserver.RenderJSON(
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w,
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http.StatusNotFound,
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map[string]string{
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"error": "not found",
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},
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)
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}
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func NewServer(cfg Config) (*Server, error) {
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if cfg.Probo == nil {
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return nil, ErrMissingProboService
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}
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if cfg.IAM == nil {
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return nil, ErrMissingIAMService
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}
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if cfg.Slack == nil {
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return nil, ErrMissingSlackService
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}
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csrf := http.NewCrossOriginProtection()
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for _, origin := range cfg.AllowedOrigins {
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if err := csrf.AddTrustedOrigin(origin); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot add trusted origin %q: %w", origin, err)
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}
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}
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// The SAML Assertion Consumer Service endpoint receives cross-origin
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// POSTs from external identity providers by design.
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csrf.AddInsecureBypassPattern("POST /connect/v1/saml/2.0/consume")
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// The cookie banner API is called cross-origin from customer websites
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// by the JS SDK. CORS is handled by the cookie banner middleware.
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// GET and OPTIONS are safe methods (always allowed), but we bypass
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// POST explicitly since it comes from customer origins.
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csrf.AddInsecureBypassPattern("POST /cookie-banner/v1/{rest...}")
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// OAuth2 token, introspection, revocation, and device authorization
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// endpoints receive cross-origin POSTs from external clients.
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csrf.AddInsecureBypassPattern("POST /connect/v1/oauth2/token")
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csrf.AddInsecureBypassPattern("POST /connect/v1/oauth2/introspect")
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csrf.AddInsecureBypassPattern("POST /connect/v1/oauth2/revoke")
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csrf.AddInsecureBypassPattern("POST /connect/v1/oauth2/device")
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csrf.SetDenyHandler(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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httpserver.RenderJSON(
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w,
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http.StatusForbidden,
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map[string]string{
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"error": "cross-origin request denied",
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},
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)
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}))
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return &Server{
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cfg: cfg,
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csrf: csrf,
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compliancePageHandler: trust_v1.NewMux(
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cfg.Logger.Named("trust.v1"),
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cfg.IAM,
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cfg.Trust,
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cfg.ESign,
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cfg.Mailman,
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cfg.Cookie,
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cfg.TokenSecret,
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cfg.BaseURL,
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),
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consoleHandler: console_v1.NewMux(
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cfg.Logger.Named("console.v1"),
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cfg.Probo,
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cfg.IAM,
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cfg.ESign,
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cfg.AccessReview,
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cfg.Mailman,
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cfg.CookieBanner,
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cfg.Cookie,
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cfg.TokenSecret,
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cfg.ConnectorRegistry,
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cfg.BaseURL,
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cfg.CustomDomainCname,
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cfg.ThirdParty,
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cfg.RiskManagement,
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),
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cookieBannerHandler: cookiebanner_v1.NewMux(
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cfg.Logger.Named("cookiebanner.v1"),
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cfg.CookieBanner,
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cfg.Geoloc,
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),
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filesHandler: files_v1.NewMux(
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cfg.Logger.Named("files.v1"),
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cfg.File,
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),
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mcpHandler: mcp_v1.NewMux(
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cfg.Logger.Named("mcp.v1"),
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cfg.Probo,
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cfg.IAM,
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cfg.AccessReview,
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cfg.CookieBanner,
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cfg.TokenSecret,
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),
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slackHandler: slack_v1.NewMux(
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cfg.Logger.Named("slack.v1"),
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cfg.Slack,
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cfg.Trust,
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),
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connectHandler: connect_v1.NewMux(
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cfg.Logger.Named("connect.v1"),
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cfg.IAM,
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cfg.Cookie,
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cfg.TokenSecret,
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cfg.BaseURL,
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func(ctx context.Context, host string) bool {
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if host == cfg.BaseURL.Host() {
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return true
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}
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_, err := cfg.Trust.GetByDomainName(ctx, host)
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return err == nil
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},
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func(ctx context.Context, host string) bool {
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_, err := cfg.Trust.GetByDomainName(ctx, host)
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return err == nil
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},
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),
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}, nil
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}
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func (s *Server) CompliancePageHandler() http.Handler {
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return s.compliancePageHandler
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}
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func (s *Server) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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corsOpts := cors.Options{
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AllowedOrigins: s.cfg.AllowedOrigins,
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AllowedMethods: []string{"GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "HEAD"},
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AllowedHeaders: []string{"content-type", "traceparent", "authorization"},
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ExposedHeaders: []string{"x-request-id"},
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AllowCredentials: true,
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MaxAge: 600, // 10 minutes (chrome >= 76 maximum value c.f. https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:services/network/public/cpp/cors/preflight_result.cc;drc=52002151773d8cd9ffc5f557cd7cc880fddcae3e;l=36)
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OptionsPassthrough: false,
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Debug: false,
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}
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w.Header().Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
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w.Header().Set("X-XSS-Protection", "0")
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w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
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w.Header().Set("Referrer-Policy", "no-referrer")
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w.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'self'")
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w.Header().Set("Permissions-Policy", "microphone=(), camera=(), geolocation=()")
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router := chi.NewRouter()
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router.MethodNotAllowed(methodNotAllowed)
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router.NotFound(notFound)
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// Cookie banner has its own per-banner CORS middleware; mount it
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// outside the global CORS handler so OPTIONS preflights from
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// customer websites are not swallowed by the stricter AllowedOrigins
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// list that applies to console/connect routes.
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router.Mount("/cookie-banner/v1", http.StripPrefix("/cookie-banner/v1", s.cookieBannerHandler))
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router.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
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r.Use(cors.Handler(corsOpts))
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r.Mount("/console/v1", http.StripPrefix("/console/v1", s.consoleHandler))
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r.Mount("/connect/v1", http.StripPrefix("/connect/v1", s.connectHandler))
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r.Mount("/files/v1", http.StripPrefix("/files/v1", s.filesHandler))
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r.Mount("/trust/v1", http.StripPrefix("/trust/v1", s.compliancePageHandler))
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r.Mount("/mcp/v1", http.StripPrefix("/mcp/v1", s.mcpHandler))
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r.Mount("/slack/v1", http.StripPrefix("/slack/v1", s.slackHandler))
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})
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s.csrf.Handler(router).ServeHTTP(w, r)
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}
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