Files
probo/pkg/server/api/api.go
Sacha Al Himdani b9262b5150 Add risk assessment system
Introduce a hierarchical risk assessment model with six entity types:

- Risk Assessment: top-level container scoped to an organization
- Risk Assessment Scope: sub-container for scoping threat modeling
  exercises within an assessment
- Risk Assessment Node: DFD elements typed as ENTITY, BOUNDARY,
  ASSET, or DATA within a scope
- Risk Assessment Process: directed data flows between two nodes
- Risk Assessment Threat: descriptive threats attached to a process
  with a free-text category (e.g. Confidentiality, Integrity)
- Risk Scenario: thin join linking a threat to a risk from the
  register, carrying only a name and description

Risk scoring (likelihood, impact, treatment) remains on the existing
Risk entity. Threats are purely descriptive. Risk Scenarios connect
the threat model to the risk register without duplicating scores.

Backend: migration with PG enum for node types, coredata structs,
service layer with full CRUD and validation, GraphQL schema with
18 mutations and paginated connections, authorization actions and
policies, and base_resolvers.go Node dispatch for all entity types.

Frontend: Risk Assessments list page with create dialog, detail page
showing scopes as cards with nodes/processes/threats tables, inline
create/edit/delete actions on all entities, and a Scenarios tab on
the Risk detail page linking threats to risks. Existing RiskGraph.ts
hook file removed in favor of colocated queries in page files.

E2E tests cover CRUD for all entity types, RBAC, and tenant
isolation.

Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@getprobo.com>
2026-05-19 21:44:27 +02:00

289 lines
8.8 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) 2025-2026 Probo Inc <hello@getprobo.com>.
//
// Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
// purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
// copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
//
// THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH
// REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
// AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT,
// INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM
// LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR
// OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
// PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
package api
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"github.com/go-chi/cors"
"go.gearno.de/kit/httpserver"
"go.gearno.de/kit/log"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/accessreview"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/baseurl"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/connector"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/cookiebanner"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/esign"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/file"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/geoloc"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/iam"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/mailman"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/probo"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/riskmanagement"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/securecookie"
connect_v1 "go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/server/api/connect/v1"
console_v1 "go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/server/api/console/v1"
cookiebanner_v1 "go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/server/api/cookiebanner/v1"
files_v1 "go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/server/api/files/v1"
mcp_v1 "go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/server/api/mcp/v1"
slack_v1 "go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/server/api/slack/v1"
trust_v1 "go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/server/api/trust/v1"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/slack"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/thirdparty"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/trust"
)
type (
Config struct {
BaseURL *baseurl.BaseURL
AllowedOrigins []string
Probo *probo.Service
File *file.Service
IAM *iam.Service
Trust *trust.Service
ESign *esign.Service
AccessReview *accessreview.Service
Slack *slack.Service
Mailman *mailman.Service
CookieBanner *cookiebanner.Service
Geoloc *geoloc.Service
ThirdParty *thirdparty.Service
RiskManagement *riskmanagement.Service
Cookie securecookie.Config
TokenSecret string
ConnectorRegistry *connector.ConnectorRegistry
CustomDomainCname string
Logger *log.Logger
}
MCPConfig struct {
Version string
RequestTimeout time.Duration
MaxRequestSize int64
}
Server struct {
cfg Config
csrf *http.CrossOriginProtection
compliancePageHandler http.Handler
consoleHandler http.Handler
cookieBannerHandler http.Handler
filesHandler http.Handler
mcpHandler http.Handler
slackHandler http.Handler
connectHandler http.Handler
}
)
var (
ErrMissingProboService = errors.New("server configuration requires a valid probo.Service instance")
ErrMissingIAMService = errors.New("server configuration requires a valid iam.Service instance")
ErrMissingSlackService = errors.New("server configuration requires a valid slack.Service instance")
)
func methodNotAllowed(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
defer func() { _ = r.Body.Close() }()
httpserver.RenderJSON(
w,
http.StatusMethodNotAllowed,
map[string]string{
"error": "method not allowed",
},
)
}
func notFound(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
defer func() { _ = r.Body.Close() }()
httpserver.RenderJSON(
w,
http.StatusNotFound,
map[string]string{
"error": "not found",
},
)
}
func NewServer(cfg Config) (*Server, error) {
if cfg.Probo == nil {
return nil, ErrMissingProboService
}
if cfg.IAM == nil {
return nil, ErrMissingIAMService
}
if cfg.Slack == nil {
return nil, ErrMissingSlackService
}
csrf := http.NewCrossOriginProtection()
for _, origin := range cfg.AllowedOrigins {
if err := csrf.AddTrustedOrigin(origin); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot add trusted origin %q: %w", origin, err)
}
}
// The SAML Assertion Consumer Service endpoint receives cross-origin
// POSTs from external identity providers by design.
csrf.AddInsecureBypassPattern("POST /connect/v1/saml/2.0/consume")
// The cookie banner API is called cross-origin from customer websites
// by the JS SDK. CORS is handled by the cookie banner middleware.
// GET and OPTIONS are safe methods (always allowed), but we bypass
// POST explicitly since it comes from customer origins.
csrf.AddInsecureBypassPattern("POST /cookie-banner/v1/{rest...}")
// OAuth2 token, introspection, revocation, and device authorization
// endpoints receive cross-origin POSTs from external clients.
csrf.AddInsecureBypassPattern("POST /connect/v1/oauth2/token")
csrf.AddInsecureBypassPattern("POST /connect/v1/oauth2/introspect")
csrf.AddInsecureBypassPattern("POST /connect/v1/oauth2/revoke")
csrf.AddInsecureBypassPattern("POST /connect/v1/oauth2/device")
csrf.SetDenyHandler(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
httpserver.RenderJSON(
w,
http.StatusForbidden,
map[string]string{
"error": "cross-origin request denied",
},
)
}))
return &Server{
cfg: cfg,
csrf: csrf,
compliancePageHandler: trust_v1.NewMux(
cfg.Logger.Named("trust.v1"),
cfg.IAM,
cfg.Trust,
cfg.ESign,
cfg.Mailman,
cfg.Cookie,
cfg.TokenSecret,
cfg.BaseURL,
),
consoleHandler: console_v1.NewMux(
cfg.Logger.Named("console.v1"),
cfg.Probo,
cfg.IAM,
cfg.ESign,
cfg.AccessReview,
cfg.Mailman,
cfg.CookieBanner,
cfg.Cookie,
cfg.TokenSecret,
cfg.ConnectorRegistry,
cfg.BaseURL,
cfg.CustomDomainCname,
cfg.ThirdParty,
cfg.RiskManagement,
),
cookieBannerHandler: cookiebanner_v1.NewMux(
cfg.Logger.Named("cookiebanner.v1"),
cfg.CookieBanner,
cfg.Geoloc,
),
filesHandler: files_v1.NewMux(
cfg.Logger.Named("files.v1"),
cfg.File,
),
mcpHandler: mcp_v1.NewMux(
cfg.Logger.Named("mcp.v1"),
cfg.Probo,
cfg.IAM,
cfg.AccessReview,
cfg.CookieBanner,
cfg.TokenSecret,
),
slackHandler: slack_v1.NewMux(
cfg.Logger.Named("slack.v1"),
cfg.Slack,
cfg.Trust,
),
connectHandler: connect_v1.NewMux(
cfg.Logger.Named("connect.v1"),
cfg.IAM,
cfg.Cookie,
cfg.TokenSecret,
cfg.BaseURL,
func(ctx context.Context, host string) bool {
if host == cfg.BaseURL.Host() {
return true
}
_, err := cfg.Trust.GetByDomainName(ctx, host)
return err == nil
},
func(ctx context.Context, host string) bool {
_, err := cfg.Trust.GetByDomainName(ctx, host)
return err == nil
},
),
}, nil
}
func (s *Server) CompliancePageHandler() http.Handler {
return s.compliancePageHandler
}
func (s *Server) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
corsOpts := cors.Options{
AllowedOrigins: s.cfg.AllowedOrigins,
AllowedMethods: []string{"GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "HEAD"},
AllowedHeaders: []string{"content-type", "traceparent", "authorization"},
ExposedHeaders: []string{"x-request-id"},
AllowCredentials: true,
MaxAge: 600, // 10 minutes (chrome >= 76 maximum value c.f. https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:services/network/public/cpp/cors/preflight_result.cc;drc=52002151773d8cd9ffc5f557cd7cc880fddcae3e;l=36)
OptionsPassthrough: false,
Debug: false,
}
w.Header().Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
w.Header().Set("X-XSS-Protection", "0")
w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
w.Header().Set("Referrer-Policy", "no-referrer")
w.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'self'")
w.Header().Set("Permissions-Policy", "microphone=(), camera=(), geolocation=()")
router := chi.NewRouter()
router.MethodNotAllowed(methodNotAllowed)
router.NotFound(notFound)
// Cookie banner has its own per-banner CORS middleware; mount it
// outside the global CORS handler so OPTIONS preflights from
// customer websites are not swallowed by the stricter AllowedOrigins
// list that applies to console/connect routes.
router.Mount("/cookie-banner/v1", http.StripPrefix("/cookie-banner/v1", s.cookieBannerHandler))
router.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(cors.Handler(corsOpts))
r.Mount("/console/v1", http.StripPrefix("/console/v1", s.consoleHandler))
r.Mount("/connect/v1", http.StripPrefix("/connect/v1", s.connectHandler))
r.Mount("/files/v1", http.StripPrefix("/files/v1", s.filesHandler))
r.Mount("/trust/v1", http.StripPrefix("/trust/v1", s.compliancePageHandler))
r.Mount("/mcp/v1", http.StripPrefix("/mcp/v1", s.mcpHandler))
r.Mount("/slack/v1", http.StripPrefix("/slack/v1", s.slackHandler))
})
s.csrf.Handler(router).ServeHTTP(w, r)
}