Files
probo/pkg/accessreview/drivers/scaleway.go
Aurélien Sibiril b408aab59d Add Scaleway, Yousign, Railway and Crisp access-review connectors
Four API-key, single-tenant (Pattern 3) connectors:

- Scaleway: secret key in the X-Auth-Token header plus an Organization ID
  setting; GET /iam/v1alpha1/users (owner/member, status, two-factor),
  per-connection BuildProbeURL.
- Yousign: Bearer API key; GET /v3/users (admin/owner/member, is_active);
  production host with a static probe.
- Railway: Bearer account token; GraphQL me{workspaces{members}} aggregated
  and deduplicated across workspaces; custom probe, since Railway returns
  HTTP 200 with an errors body on a rejected token.
- Crisp: plugin token as HTTP Basic (identifier:key) plus a Website ID
  setting and the X-Crisp-Tier header; GET /v1/website/{id}/operators/list,
  custom probe and name resolver.

Scaleway and Crisp carry a required extra setting, so the console add-source
dialog maps organizationId/websiteId onto their scalewayOrganizationId and
crispWebsiteId API-key inputs; without that mapping the value is silently
dropped and the create is rejected.

Cassette-backed driver tests plus unit tests for the cross-workspace
deduplication, the probe contracts and the role/MFA helpers.

Signed-off-by: Aurélien Sibiril <81782+aureliensibiril@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-10 18:29:54 +02:00

238 lines
6.8 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) 2026 Probo Inc <hello@probo.com>.
//
// Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
// purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
// copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
//
// THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH
// REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
// AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT,
// INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM
// LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR
// OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
// PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
package drivers
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/coredata"
)
const (
scalewayAPIHost = "api.scaleway.com"
scalewayUsersPath = "/iam/v1alpha1/users"
scalewayPageSize = 100
)
// ScalewayDriver lists the IAM users of a single Scaleway Organization. The
// secret key (sent in the X-Auth-Token header by the connection transport) is
// scoped to one Organization, but GET /iam/v1alpha1/users requires the
// organization_id explicitly, so it is captured up front as a connector
// setting rather than discovered.
type ScalewayDriver struct {
httpClient *http.Client
organizationID string
}
var _ Driver = (*ScalewayDriver)(nil)
type scalewayUsersResponse struct {
Users []scalewayUser `json:"users"`
TotalCount uint32 `json:"total_count"`
}
type scalewayUser struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Email string `json:"email"`
Username string `json:"username"`
FirstName string `json:"first_name"`
LastName string `json:"last_name"`
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
LastLoginAt *string `json:"last_login_at"`
// Type is the org-level user type ("owner" | "member"). Fine-grained IAM
// roles live on separate policy/group endpoints and are out of scope.
Type string `json:"type"`
Status string `json:"status"`
// MFA is always present; TwoFactorEnabled is the newer pointer mirror of
// the same state and is preferred when set (see scalewayMFAStatus).
MFA bool `json:"mfa"`
TwoFactorEnabled *bool `json:"two_factor_enabled"`
Locked bool `json:"locked"`
}
func NewScalewayDriver(httpClient *http.Client, organizationID string) *ScalewayDriver {
return &ScalewayDriver{
httpClient: httpClient,
organizationID: organizationID,
}
}
func (d *ScalewayDriver) ListAccounts(ctx context.Context) ([]AccountRecord, error) {
var records []AccountRecord
fetched := 0
page := 1
for range maxPaginationPages {
resp, err := d.fetchPage(ctx, page)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
for _, u := range resp.Users {
email := strings.TrimSpace(u.Email)
if email == "" {
continue
}
record := AccountRecord{
Email: email,
FullName: scalewayFullName(u, email),
Roles: scalewayRoles(u.Type),
Active: scalewayActive(u.Status, u.Locked),
IsAdmin: strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(u.Type), "owner"),
MFAStatus: scalewayMFAStatus(u),
AuthMethod: coredata.AccessReviewEntryAuthMethodUnknown,
AccountType: coredata.AccessReviewEntryAccountTypeUser,
CreatedAt: parseRFC3339Ptr(u.CreatedAt),
ExternalID: strings.TrimSpace(u.ID),
}
if u.LastLoginAt != nil {
record.LastLogin = parseRFC3339Ptr(*u.LastLoginAt)
}
records = append(records, record)
}
fetched += len(resp.Users)
if len(resp.Users) < scalewayPageSize || uint32(fetched) >= resp.TotalCount {
return records, nil
}
page++
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot list all scaleway accounts: %w", ErrPaginationLimitReached)
}
func (d *ScalewayDriver) fetchPage(ctx context.Context, page int) (*scalewayUsersResponse, error) {
q := url.Values{}
q.Set("organization_id", d.organizationID)
q.Set("order_by", "created_at_asc")
q.Set("page", strconv.Itoa(page))
q.Set("page_size", strconv.Itoa(scalewayPageSize))
endpoint := url.URL{
Scheme: "https",
Host: scalewayAPIHost,
Path: scalewayUsersPath,
RawQuery: q.Encode(),
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, endpoint.String(), nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot create scaleway users request: %w", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
httpResp, err := d.httpClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot execute scaleway users request: %w", err)
}
defer func() { _ = httpResp.Body.Close() }()
if httpResp.StatusCode < 200 || httpResp.StatusCode >= 300 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot fetch scaleway users: unexpected status %d", httpResp.StatusCode)
}
var resp scalewayUsersResponse
if err := json.NewDecoder(httpResp.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot decode scaleway users response: %w", err)
}
return &resp, nil
}
func scalewayFullName(u scalewayUser, fallback string) string {
if name := strings.TrimSpace(u.FirstName + " " + u.LastName); name != "" {
return name
}
if username := strings.TrimSpace(u.Username); username != "" {
return username
}
return fallback
}
// scalewayRoles maps the Scaleway org-level user type to a display label. The
// users endpoint exposes only owner/member; an unknown future value is passed
// through verbatim and no type yields an empty slice.
func scalewayRoles(userType string) []string {
switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(userType)) {
case "owner":
return []string{"Owner"}
case "member":
return []string{"Member"}
default:
if t := strings.TrimSpace(userType); t != "" {
return []string{t}
}
return []string{}
}
}
// scalewayActive maps the Scaleway user status to the three-valued Active
// signal. A locked account is always inactive; otherwise only the documented
// "activated"/"invitation_pending" values are an explicit signal and any other
// or missing status leaves Active nil (no signal). The literal live value is
// "activated", not "active", so the shared activeFromStatus helper is not used.
func scalewayActive(status string, locked bool) *bool {
if locked {
inactive := false
return &inactive
}
switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(status)) {
case "activated":
active := true
return &active
case "invitation_pending":
inactive := false
return &inactive
default:
return nil
}
}
// scalewayMFAStatus reads the two-factor state, preferring the newer
// two_factor_enabled pointer when present and otherwise the always-present mfa
// boolean.
func scalewayMFAStatus(u scalewayUser) coredata.MFAStatus {
enabled := u.MFA
if u.TwoFactorEnabled != nil {
enabled = *u.TwoFactorEnabled
}
if enabled {
return coredata.MFAStatusEnabled
}
return coredata.MFAStatusDisabled
}