Files
probo/pkg/server/api/console/v1/resolver.go
Bryan Frimin bf255b198c Bound GraphQL request cost to prevent alias-flooding DoS
The GraphQL endpoint built its gqlgen server with bare handler.New and
no limits, so a single request with thousands of aliased resolver calls
was parsed, validated, executed, and marshalled in full. Under load this
let an unauthenticated client drive excessive CPU and memory use against
POST /api/connect/v1/graphql and the console and trust endpoints, which
share the same constructor (GHSA-prh2-g8pv-m7p9).

Add configurable guards in the shared gqlutils.NewHandler: a parser
token limit rejects oversized queries at lex time before any execution,
a fixed complexity limit caps field-selection count, an LRU query cache
avoids repeated parsing, and field suggestions are disabled. The limits
flow from a new APIConfig.GraphQL section through server and api config
into all three GraphQL handlers, with PROBOD_API_GRAPHQL_* env vars and
Helm values exposed for per-environment tuning.

Defaults are sized with generous headroom over real traffic: the parser
token limit (15000) and complexity limit (2000) sit far above the
largest legitimate frontend query yet well below the proof-of-concept
flood, so normal usage is unaffected while floods are rejected cheaply.

Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@probo.com>
2026-06-30 14:10:41 +02:00

480 lines
15 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) 2025-2026 Probo Inc <hello@probo.com>.
//
// Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
// purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
// copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
//
// THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH
// REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
// AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT,
// INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM
// LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR
// OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
// PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
//go:generate go tool github.com/99designs/gqlgen generate
package console_v1
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"go.gearno.de/kit/httpserver"
"go.gearno.de/kit/log"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/accessreview"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/agentrun"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/baseurl"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/connector"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/connector/provider"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/cookiebanner"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/coredata"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/esign"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/filemanager"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/gid"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/iam"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/mailman"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/probo"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/resourcealias"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/riskmanagement"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/saferedirect"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/securecookie"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/server/api/authn"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/server/api/authz"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/server/api/console/v1/dataloader"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/server/api/console/v1/types"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/server/gqlutils"
"go.probo.inc/probo/pkg/thirdparty"
)
type (
Resolver struct {
authorize authz.AuthorizeFunc
batchAuthorize authz.BatchAuthorizeFunc
probo *probo.Service
resourceAlias *resourcealias.Service
iam *iam.Service
esign *esign.Service
accessReview *accessreview.Service
agentRun *agentrun.Service
mailman *mailman.Service
cookieBanner *cookiebanner.Service
connectorRegistry *connector.ConnectorRegistry
providerRegistry *provider.Registry
riskManagement *riskmanagement.Service
thirdParty *thirdparty.Service
logger *log.Logger
fileManager *filemanager.Service
baseURL *baseurl.BaseURL
customDomainCname string
}
)
func NewMux(
logger *log.Logger,
proboSvc *probo.Service,
resourceAliasSvc *resourcealias.Service,
iamSvc *iam.Service,
esignSvc *esign.Service,
accessReviewSvc *accessreview.Service,
agentRunSvc *agentrun.Service,
mailmanSvc *mailman.Service,
cookieBannerSvc *cookiebanner.Service,
cookieConfig securecookie.Config,
tokenSecret string,
connectorRegistry *connector.ConnectorRegistry,
providerRegistry *provider.Registry,
fileManagerSvc *filemanager.Service,
baseURL *baseurl.BaseURL,
customDomainCname string,
thirdPartySvc *thirdparty.Service,
riskManagementSvc *riskmanagement.Service,
graphqlLimits gqlutils.Limits,
) *chi.Mux {
r := chi.NewMux()
safeRedirect := saferedirect.New(saferedirect.StaticHosts(baseURL.Host()))
graphqlHandler := NewGraphQLHandler(
iamSvc,
proboSvc,
resourceAliasSvc,
esignSvc,
accessReviewSvc,
agentRunSvc,
mailmanSvc,
cookieBannerSvc,
connectorRegistry,
providerRegistry,
customDomainCname,
logger,
thirdPartySvc,
riskManagementSvc,
fileManagerSvc,
baseURL,
graphqlLimits,
)
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(authn.NewSessionMiddleware(iamSvc, cookieConfig))
r.Use(authn.NewAPIKeyMiddleware(iamSvc, tokenSecret))
r.Use(authn.NewOAuth2AccessTokenMiddleware(iamSvc))
r.Use(authn.NewIdentityPresenceMiddleware(baseURL))
r.Use(dataloader.NewMiddleware(proboSvc, iamSvc, cookieBannerSvc, thirdPartySvc))
r.Handle("/graphql", graphqlHandler)
r.Get(
"/connectors/initiate",
handleConnectorInitiate(logger, proboSvc, iamSvc, connectorRegistry),
)
r.Get(
"/connectors/complete",
handleConnectorComplete(
logger,
baseURL,
proboSvc,
connectorRegistry,
safeRedirect,
),
)
})
// Public, unauthenticated: the OAuth Client ID Metadata Document (CIMD)
// is fetched server-to-server by public-client providers (PostHog)
// during authorization, with no Probo credentials. Mounted outside the
// auth group above.
r.Get("/connectors/oauth-client-metadata", handleConnectorOAuth2ClientMetadata(baseURL))
return r
}
func handleConnectorComplete(
logger *log.Logger,
baseURL *baseurl.BaseURL,
proboSvc *probo.Service,
connectorRegistry *connector.ConnectorRegistry,
safeRedirect *saferedirect.SafeRedirect,
) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
query := r.URL.Query()
if oauthErr := query.Get("error"); oauthErr != "" {
handleConnectorOAuth2Error(w, r, logger, baseURL, safeRedirect, query)
return
}
stateToken := query.Get("state")
if stateToken == "" {
httpserver.RenderError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("missing state parameter"))
return
}
provider, err := connector.ExtractProviderFromState(stateToken)
if err != nil {
httpserver.RenderError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("cannot extract provider from state: %w", err))
return
}
var connectorProvider coredata.ConnectorProvider
if err := connectorProvider.UnmarshalText([]byte(provider)); err != nil {
httpserver.RenderError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("unsupported provider: %q", provider))
return
}
connection, state, err := connectorRegistry.CompleteWithState(r.Context(), provider, r)
if err != nil {
logger.ErrorCtx(r.Context(), "cannot complete connector", log.Error(err))
httpserver.RenderError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Errorf("internal error"))
return
}
organizationID, err := gid.ParseGID(state.OrganizationID)
if err != nil {
httpserver.RenderError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("cannot parse organization ID from state: %w", err))
return
}
scope := coredata.NewScopeFromObjectID(organizationID)
svc := proboSvc
var cnnctr *coredata.Connector
// Some providers persist per-customer settings on the connector,
// captured here for both the create and the reconnect path: Datadog
// echoes its API domain as a `domain` callback param; Zendesk's
// subdomain rode the signed OAuth state from initiate (it is not
// echoed back). Both become a URL host, so each is re-validated
// before use. At most one block applies per callback.
var rawSettings json.RawMessage
if connectorProvider == coredata.ConnectorProviderDatadog {
domain := query.Get("domain")
if !connector.IsValidDatadogDomain(domain) {
logger.WarnCtx(r.Context(), "rejecting invalid datadog domain",
log.String("provider", string(connectorProvider)),
)
httpserver.RenderError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("invalid domain"))
return
}
region, _ := connector.DatadogSiteForDomain(domain)
raw, err := json.Marshal(&coredata.DatadogConnectorSettings{
Region: region,
Domain: domain,
})
if err != nil {
logger.ErrorCtx(r.Context(), "cannot marshal datadog settings", log.Error(err))
httpserver.RenderError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Errorf("internal error"))
return
}
rawSettings = raw
}
if connectorProvider == coredata.ConnectorProviderZendesk {
// The subdomain is HMAC-signed in the state (untamperable) and was
// validated at initiate, but re-validate it here too — it becomes
// a URL host on every API call (defense-in-depth).
if !connector.IsValidZendeskSubdomain(state.Site) {
logger.WarnCtx(r.Context(), "rejecting invalid zendesk subdomain",
log.String("provider", string(connectorProvider)),
)
httpserver.RenderError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("invalid subdomain"))
return
}
raw, err := json.Marshal(&coredata.ZendeskConnectorSettings{
Subdomain: state.Site,
})
if err != nil {
logger.ErrorCtx(r.Context(), "cannot marshal zendesk settings", log.Error(err))
httpserver.RenderError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Errorf("internal error"))
return
}
rawSettings = raw
}
// If a connector_id was passed in the state, this is a
// reconnection — update the existing connector's token.
if state.ConnectorID != "" {
connectorID, err := gid.ParseGID(state.ConnectorID)
if err != nil {
httpserver.RenderError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("cannot parse connector ID from state: %w", err))
return
}
cnnctr, err = svc.Connectors.Reconnect(
r.Context(),
scope,
probo.ReconnectConnectorRequest{
ConnectorID: connectorID,
OrganizationID: organizationID,
Provider: connectorProvider,
Connection: connection,
RawSettings: rawSettings,
},
)
if err != nil {
logger.ErrorCtx(r.Context(), "cannot reconnect connector", log.Error(err))
httpserver.RenderError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Errorf("internal error"))
return
}
} else {
createReq := probo.CreateConnectorRequest{
OrganizationID: organizationID,
Provider: connectorProvider,
Protocol: coredata.ConnectorProtocol(connection.Type()),
Connection: connection,
}
// PagerDuty Scoped OAuth surfaces the customer's subdomain as
// a `subdomain` query parameter on the redirect URL (not in
// the token response body). Persist it on the connector
// settings so the driver and name resolver can read it.
if connectorProvider == coredata.ConnectorProviderPagerDuty {
subdomain := query.Get("subdomain")
if subdomain == "" {
// Fall back to ProviderMetadata for older OAuth flows
// that may have surfaced the subdomain through the
// token response body.
subdomain = state.ProviderMetadata["subdomain"]
}
// The subdomain comes from an attacker-influenceable
// callback parameter; refuse anything that isn't a valid
// DNS label so it cannot be smuggled into URLs or logs.
if subdomain != "" && !isValidPagerDutySubdomain(subdomain) {
logger.WarnCtx(r.Context(), "rejecting invalid pagerduty subdomain",
log.String("provider", string(connectorProvider)),
)
subdomain = ""
}
if subdomain != "" {
raw, err := json.Marshal(&coredata.PagerDutyConnectorSettings{
Subdomain: subdomain,
})
if err != nil {
logger.ErrorCtx(r.Context(), "cannot marshal pagerduty settings", log.Error(err))
httpserver.RenderError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Errorf("internal error"))
return
}
createReq.RawSettings = raw
}
}
// Vercel surfaces the customer's team_id as an OAuth callback
// query parameter (not in the token response body). When the
// install targets a personal account no team_id is sent — fall
// back to /v2/user.id as a synthetic TeamID; the v3 members
// endpoint accepts personal-account UIDs.
if connectorProvider == coredata.ConnectorProviderVercel {
teamID := query.Get("team_id")
if teamID == "" {
if oauth2Conn, ok := connection.(*connector.OAuth2Connection); ok && oauth2Conn.AccessToken != "" {
if uid, err := connector.FetchVercelUserID(r.Context(), oauth2Conn.AccessToken); err == nil {
teamID = uid
} else {
logger.WarnCtx(r.Context(), "cannot fetch vercel user id for personal-account fallback", log.Error(err))
}
}
}
if teamID != "" {
raw, err := json.Marshal(&coredata.VercelConnectorSettings{
TeamID: teamID,
})
if err != nil {
logger.ErrorCtx(r.Context(), "cannot marshal vercel settings", log.Error(err))
httpserver.RenderError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Errorf("internal error"))
return
}
createReq.RawSettings = raw
}
}
// Per-customer settings captured above (Datadog's callback domain
// or Zendesk's state subdomain) apply to the create request; at
// most one provider populates them per callback.
if rawSettings != nil {
createReq.RawSettings = rawSettings
}
cnnctr, err = svc.Connectors.Create(r.Context(), scope, createReq)
if err != nil {
logger.ErrorCtx(r.Context(), "cannot create connector", log.Error(err))
httpserver.RenderError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Errorf("internal error"))
return
}
}
redirectURL := state.ContinueURL
if redirectURL == "" {
redirectURL = baseURL.WithPath("/organizations/" + organizationID.String()).MustString()
}
parsedURL, err := url.Parse(redirectURL)
if err != nil {
logger.ErrorCtx(r.Context(), "cannot parse redirect URL", log.Error(err))
parsedURL, _ = url.Parse(baseURL.WithPath("/organizations/" + organizationID.String()).MustString())
}
q := parsedURL.Query()
q.Set("connector_id", cnnctr.ID.String())
q.Set("provider", string(connectorProvider))
parsedURL.RawQuery = q.Encode()
safeRedirect.Redirect(w, r, parsedURL.String(), "/", http.StatusSeeOther)
}
}
func handleConnectorOAuth2Error(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
logger *log.Logger,
baseURL *baseurl.BaseURL,
safeRedirect *saferedirect.SafeRedirect,
query url.Values,
) {
oauthErr := query.Get("error")
provider := "unknown"
redirectURL := baseURL.String()
if stateToken := query.Get("state"); stateToken != "" {
if payload, err := connector.DecodeOAuth2StatePayload(stateToken); err == nil {
if payload.Data.Provider != "" {
provider = payload.Data.Provider
}
if payload.Data.ContinueURL != "" {
redirectURL = payload.Data.ContinueURL
}
}
}
// Provider error_description fields routinely carry PII (user emails,
// account names) and must never reach logs or the client redirect URL.
// Forward only the standardized error code.
logger.WarnCtx(r.Context(), "OAuth2 callback returned error",
log.String("provider", provider),
log.String("error", oauthErr),
)
parsedURL, _ := url.Parse(redirectURL)
q := parsedURL.Query()
q.Set("error", oauthErr)
parsedURL.RawQuery = q.Encode()
safeRedirect.Redirect(w, r, parsedURL.String(), "/", http.StatusSeeOther)
}
// isValidPagerDutySubdomain reports whether s is a single DNS label
// (RFC 1035 §2.3.1). PagerDuty subdomains are tenant identifiers that
// will be embedded in API URLs; the OAuth callback is the only place
// where a malformed value can enter the system.
func isValidPagerDutySubdomain(s string) bool {
if s == "" || len(s) > 63 {
return false
}
for _, c := range s {
switch {
case c >= 'a' && c <= 'z':
case c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z':
case c >= '0' && c <= '9':
case c == '-':
default:
return false
}
}
return true
}
func (r *Resolver) Permission(ctx context.Context, obj types.Node, action string) (bool, error) {
_, err := r.authorize(ctx, obj.GetID(), action, authz.WithDryRun())
return err == nil, nil
}