Session validity was decoupled from credential rotation: changing
a password (logged-in flow) or completing a forgot-password reset
left every existing iam_sessions row valid until its idle TTL.
A user who saw their account compromised on another device had
no way to actually evict that device by rotating the password.
Inside the same DB transaction as the password update, expire the
identity's other active sessions:
- ChangePassword keeps the caller's current session and revokes
every other session for the identity, so the user is not
logged out of the browser they just used.
- ResetPassword has no caller session (the user is anonymous,
authenticated only by a stateless token) and revokes all of
the identity's active sessions.
The session middleware already rejects rows with expire_reason
set, so revoked sessions are kicked out on the next request
without any middleware change.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@getprobo.com>
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