The session transfer handler was blindly redirecting to the continue URL
from the signed token. Use saferedirect with a trust center domain check
to prevent open redirects, and only trigger session transfer for known
trust center custom domains instead of any non-base-URL host.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@getprobo.com>
After OIDC login, if the redirect targets a trust center custom
domain, the callback now redirects through a session-transfer
endpoint on that domain. The endpoint verifies an HMAC-signed,
time-limited token and sets the session cookie on the custom
domain before redirecting to the final URL.
The continue URL is bound into the signed token payload to
prevent open-redirect attacks via parameter tampering.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@getprobo.com>
SafeRedirect previously matched against a single static host string,
so OIDC callbacks always fell back to the console instead of
redirecting back to compliance pages on custom domains. Refactor
AllowedHost into a dynamic AllowedHostFunc and wire a trust-service
lookup into the connect handler so custom domain hosts are accepted.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@getprobo.com>
The OIDC provider is already tracked in iam_oidc_states.provider, so
there is no need for provider-specific session auth methods (GOOGLE,
MICROSOFT). Replace them with a single OIDC auth method.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@getprobo.com>
Implements OpenID Connect authentication flow with PKCE, JWT verification, and enterprise-only account restrictions. Adds OIDC service with JWKS caching and state management, HTTP handlers for login/callback flows, GraphQL query for available providers, and sign-in UI integration.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@getprobo.com>
