Commit Graph

4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Ludovic Vielle
cbd0387490 Expose ACME cooldown end time and error details
Operators could see that a rate-limit cooldown was active, but not
when it ends, and failure logs omitted most of the CA problem
document. Add a until-timestamp gauge and log the full acme.Error
surface so cooldowns and ACME responses are diagnosable.

Signed-off-by: Ludovic Vielle <ludovic@probo.com>
2026-07-22 16:38:11 +02:00
Bryan Frimin
81b7ee5fad Close cert provisioning correctness gaps
Several race and validity gaps could leave certificate provisioning
stuck, unusable, or noisy:

- Accept the HTTP-01 challenge only after the key authorization is
  committed, so the CA cannot hit the token before this instance can
  serve it and invalidate the order.
- Persist challenge metadata under a blocking write-back lock; a row
  merely locked by a competing transaction no longer silently drops the
  accepted order.
- Abandon a recovered VALID order and restart instead of issuing it
  with a freshly generated key that cannot match the existing cert.
- Exclude rate-limited rows from the ten-minute stale reset so the
  resumable order survives the ACME cooldown.
- Size the provisioning poll lease to exceed the max processing window
  so a released claim lock cannot let another worker process the same
  row concurrently.
- Parse Retry-After as unsigned seconds and clamp overflow so malformed
  values fall back to the default cooldown instead of disabling it.
- Normalize the acme_errors problem_type label to the RFC 8555 set to
  bound Prometheus cardinality.

Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@probo.com>
2026-07-22 13:20:53 +02:00
Bryan Frimin
121d4dcf93 Fix certmanager provisioning retry and metrics
Address several provisioning defects that either stalled the retry
budget or crashed the process:

- Classify CAA resolver/transport failures apart from a real CAA policy
  denial. Both shared the "caa records" wording, so a transient resolver
  error was persisted as customer misconfiguration and retried forever
  without consuming the retry budget. A new ErrCAANotPermitted sentinel
  now marks the genuine misconfiguration; other CAA errors are treated
  as ordinary transient failures.

- Honor an explicit Retry-After: 0 (or a past date) as permission for an
  immediate retry instead of promoting it to the one-hour default
  cooldown. acme.RateLimit collapses zero, invalid, and absent headers
  to a zero duration, so the header is now parsed directly to tell an
  explicit zero apart from a missing one.

- Reuse already-registered Prometheus collectors when a second
  ACMEService shares a registerer. The fixed-name collectors were
  MustRegistered, so a duplicate registration panicked the process.

- Persist provisioning failures on a context detached from the process
  tick deadline. A timed-out attempt reached persistFailure with an
  expired context, so the write-back failed and the retry budget never
  advanced, leaving the certificate indefinitely retriable.

- Use pgx.StrictNamedArgs in the certificate FOR UPDATE loaders to match
  the coredata SQL contract.

Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@probo.com>
2026-07-22 13:20:52 +02:00
Bryan Frimin
9724a2ce50 Harden cert provisioning failure and write-back
Rate limits no longer inflate ssl_retry_count into an instant FAILED
path. Centralize outcomes in decideProvisioningOutcome, keep ACME
order state on transient and rate-limit errors, bound each Process
tick with a timeout, and block on FOR UPDATE when persisting a
freshly issued certificate.

Signed-off-by: Ludovic Vielle <ludovic@probo.com>
Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@probo.com>
2026-07-22 13:20:52 +02:00