Replace the deny-based restriction on granting OWNER with role-scoped
allow policies so authorization fails closed: admins may create and
update memberships only when the assigned role is not OWNER, and the
absence of a target role no longer implies permission.
To keep console UI gating accurate without loosening the base grants,
the permission field gains an optional typed options argument
(PermissionOptionsInput) that forwards target_role into the dry-run
authorization. Only the two role-related console calls (create user,
update membership) pass it; the OWNER option stays hidden for admins via
the existing assignable-roles helper.
Add a non-regression test that an admin cannot promote a member to OWNER
while still being able to change members between non-owner roles.
An organization ADMIN could hard-remove members, including OWNERs, because
removeUser (connect and MCP) only checked the weaker iam:membership-profile:delete
gate. Authorize the owner-only iam:membership:delete instead, and expose the
source attribute on MembershipProfile so the owner grant's non-SCIM condition
can match.
Consolidate ownership-grant authorization into policy for both createUser and
updateMembership: each resolver passes the requested role as a target_role
attribute and ADMIN is denied granting ownership via deny-create-owner /
deny-promote-owner. target_role is distinct from resource.role, which is the
target's current role and guards editing existing owners. With no callers left,
the iam:membership-role:set-owner action (grant and OAuth2 scope) is removed.
Also pass the authorized scope through to the RemoveUser/CreateUser services,
gate the console Remove action on iam:membership:delete, and add regression
tests plus a changelog entry.
Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
The CLI still defaulted to *.console.getprobo.com for region
selection, examples, and the non-interactive fallback host. Align
those with the current SaaS hostnames so new logins store the right
config keys.
Signed-off-by: Ludovic Vielle <ludovic@probo.com>
probod-bootstrap could only resolve aws:// Secrets Manager refs.
Add awsps:// for SSM Parameter Store (GetParameter with decryption)
and awssm:// as an explicit Secrets Manager prefix. Keep aws:// for
backward compatibility. Values are cached per run per backend.
Update Helm, .env.example, and probod-bootstrap changelog.
Signed-off-by: Ludovic Vielle <ludovic@probo.com>
Introduce a Resolver that owns env lookup and typed parsing for
probod-bootstrap. Env values prefixed with aws://<secret-id> are
fetched from AWS Secrets Manager (plaintext SecretString); each
secret ID is cached per run. Builder now takes a Resolver only.
Prefix every probod-bootstrap input with PROBOD_ so bootstrap config
does not collide with unrelated process environment (for example
AWS_* used by other tooling). Secrets Manager authentication uses
the standard AWS SDK default chain (AWS_REGION, IAM role, profile);
PROBOD_AWS_* vars configure S3 in the generated config only.
Update Helm deployment env names, GNUmakefile dev-config, Lima
provision, e2e testutil, compose.prod.yaml, and docs.
Deployments must rename bootstrap env vars to PROBOD_* (e.g.
AUTH_COOKIE_SECRET → PROBOD_AUTH_COOKIE_SECRET).
BREAKING CHANGE: all env vars are now prefixed by `PROBOD_`.
Signed-off-by: Ludovic Vielle <ludovic@probo.com>
