Session validity was decoupled from credential rotation: changing
a password (logged-in flow) or completing a forgot-password reset
left every existing iam_sessions row valid until its idle TTL.
A user who saw their account compromised on another device had
no way to actually evict that device by rotating the password.
Inside the same DB transaction as the password update, expire the
identity's other active sessions:
- ChangePassword keeps the caller's current session and revokes
every other session for the identity, so the user is not
logged out of the browser they just used.
- ResetPassword has no caller session (the user is anonymous,
authenticated only by a stateless token) and revokes all of
the identity's active sessions.
The session middleware already rejects rows with expire_reason
set, so revoked sessions are kicked out on the next request
without any middleware change.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@getprobo.com>
The OIDC provider is already tracked in iam_oidc_states.provider, so
there is no need for provider-specific session auth methods (GOOGLE,
MICROSOFT). Replace them with a single OIDC auth method.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@getprobo.com>
Implements OpenID Connect authentication flow with PKCE, JWT verification, and enterprise-only account restrictions. Adds OIDC service with JWKS caching and state management, HTTP handlers for login/callback flows, GraphQL query for available providers, and sign-in UI integration.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@getprobo.com>
