Embed and build @probo/compliance-portal for the
/trust path and custom-domain SPA so production
ships the v2 portal. Keep apps/trust in the repo
for local use on port 5175; portal takes 5174.
Signed-off-by: Émile Ré <emile@probo.com>
Update webhook events now carry a top-level "updatedFrom" field
alongside "data", containing a full snapshot of the entity as it was
before the update. This lets subscribers diff old vs new state (for
example the prior membership role on user:updated) without tracking
prior state themselves. It is a complete snapshot with the same shape as
"data", not a partial diff, so consumers select whatever fields they
need. The field is omitted for non-update events.
The webhook_data table gains a nullable updated_from JSONB column, and
webhook.InsertUpdateData enqueues both snapshots; InsertData delegates to
it with a nil updatedFrom so non-update callers are unaffected. Each
*:updated emission site snapshots the entity right after load, before
mutation: obligation, third-party, user (org and SCIM flows), document,
document-version, and document-version-approval-quorum. The document
emit helpers gained an optional updatedFrom argument threaded through to
the payload.
For document-version-approval-quorum:updated the snapshot requires an
extra query, so it is now gated behind the same subscription-existence
check the emitter uses: when no subscriber is configured the load is
skipped entirely rather than running (and potentially failing the
approval) for an event nobody receives.
Add integration tests (against a real Postgres, skipped when none is
reachable) covering the updated_from round-trip, the SQL NULL behavior
when no snapshot is provided, and the no-op when no subscription matches,
plus a unit test asserting updatedFrom is omitted from the payload when
absent.
Document the new field in the probod and n8n changelogs and the n8n
README.
Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
The source headers, LICENSE files, and license metadata had drifted
apart. Align the entire project to MIT:
- Convert every source-file header to the MIT text across all comment
styles (Go, TS, TSX, JS, MJS, SQL, CSS, GraphQL, shell), including
SPDX-License-Identifier tags
- Set the root and cookie-banner LICENSE files to the MIT text with a
"MIT License" title line
- Switch the package.json license fields, Docker image label, and
cookie-banner README to MIT
- Update docs and the genmodels header generator accordingly
- Normalize copyright lines to a single format
(Copyright (c) <year(s)> Probo Inc <hello@probo.com>.): unify the
hello@getprobo.com and hello@probo.inc emails to hello@probo.com and
the comma-separated years to a hyphenated range
Genuine third-party references are intentionally left untouched: the
Lucide icon attributions (Lucide is ISC) and the trivy dependency
license allowlist.
Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
Replace the deny-based restriction on granting OWNER with role-scoped
allow policies so authorization fails closed: admins may create and
update memberships only when the assigned role is not OWNER, and the
absence of a target role no longer implies permission.
To keep console UI gating accurate without loosening the base grants,
the permission field gains an optional typed options argument
(PermissionOptionsInput) that forwards target_role into the dry-run
authorization. Only the two role-related console calls (create user,
update membership) pass it; the OWNER option stays hidden for admins via
the existing assignable-roles helper.
Add a non-regression test that an admin cannot promote a member to OWNER
while still being able to change members between non-owner roles.
An organization ADMIN could hard-remove members, including OWNERs, because
removeUser (connect and MCP) only checked the weaker iam:membership-profile:delete
gate. Authorize the owner-only iam:membership:delete instead, and expose the
source attribute on MembershipProfile so the owner grant's non-SCIM condition
can match.
Consolidate ownership-grant authorization into policy for both createUser and
updateMembership: each resolver passes the requested role as a target_role
attribute and ADMIN is denied granting ownership via deny-create-owner /
deny-promote-owner. target_role is distinct from resource.role, which is the
target's current role and guards editing existing owners. With no callers left,
the iam:membership-role:set-owner action (grant and OAuth2 scope) is removed.
Also pass the authorized scope through to the RemoveUser/CreateUser services,
gate the console Remove action on iam:membership:delete, and add regression
tests plus a changelog entry.
Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
