Route the full-name and NDA gates from the request-access flows to their
gate pages (deep-linking with the deferred continue URL) instead of a
dead-end toast, so signing or naming resumes the original request; the
shared gate-to-route mapping now lives in one helper reused by the route
boundaries and both request hooks.
Fix the NDA page redirecting to home while also redirecting to the
continue URL once the signature is sealed, surface consent/accept
failures so the sign button isn't silently inert, and build the
request-all continue URL before clearing its marker.
On the backend, return success from updateFullName when the identity has
no organization profile instead of dereferencing a nil profile, which
crashed external trust-center visitors completing the full-name gate.
Signed-off-by: Émile Ré <emile@probo.com>
The compliance portal home page rendered security-commitment cards from
a hardcoded placeholder POJO. Back them with real, per-organization data
that admins configure in the console and the portal loads over the trust
center GraphQL API.
Model two entities under the trust center: a commitment group (title,
description, rank) and a commitment card (icon, eyebrow, title,
description, rank). The card icon is a curated enum mapped to a Phosphor
icon in the portal. New entities adopt the compliance_portal_ prefix as
the start of the broader rename away from trust_center_ naming.
Expose the groups and cards read-only on the public trust API and with
full CRUD on the console API, add a Commitments tab to the compliance
page, and replace the placeholder section with a Relay-driven one.
Signed-off-by: Émile Ré <emile@probo.com>
The MCP publishDocument tool required callers to pass approver_ids and
to distinguish an omitted list (rejected) from an empty one (direct
publish), a null-vs-empty subtlety that is awkward for an LLM to get
right.
Drop approver_ids from the MCP tool and resolve a major publish's
approvers from the document's default approvers instead: an approval is
requested when the document has default approvers, otherwise the version
is published directly. Default approvers are configured with addDocument
or updateDocument.
Replace a document's default approvers on every major publish that
supplies an explicit list, even when the list is empty, so a direct
publish through the GraphQL API clears stale approvers instead of
leaving them behind (previously the empty case skipped the update).
Expose the default-approver behaviour as a separate entry point,
PublishVersionWithDefaultApprovers, that loads the defaults and
delegates to PublishVersion. PublishVersion keeps its explicit-approver
contract for the GraphQL API.
Require only the publish permission to publish a version, whether or not
it opens an approval quorum, and drop the now-unused request-approval
action.
Fold the publish steps into the publishMinor and publishMajor primitives
shared by both the single and bulk publish paths, and drop the redundant
InTx suffix from RequestApproval and emitDocumentEvent, which already
take a transaction argument.
Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
Build the Trust Center documents page: a unified list of published
documents, uploaded files, and audit reports, grouped into category
sections. An All/Public/Private tab bar filters the list by trust
center visibility.
Expose that filter over the trust v1 API by adding a
TrustCenterVisibility enum and a shared TrustCenterVisibilityFilter
input, wiring it through the documents, audits, and trustCenterFiles
connections down to the existing coredata SQL filters. "All" keeps the
default public+private slice; the other tabs pin a single visibility.
Access controls are display-only for now (auth is handled separately):
authorized or public entries open their exported PDF via the export
mutations, requested entries show a pending state, and everything else
shows an inert Get Access affordance.
Add the v2 Tabs and Toaster kit components (Base UI headless) needed by
the page and mount a toast provider at the app root for mutation
feedback.
Signed-off-by: Émile Ré <emile@probo.com>
The source headers, LICENSE files, and license metadata had drifted
apart. Align the entire project to MIT:
- Convert every source-file header to the MIT text across all comment
styles (Go, TS, TSX, JS, MJS, SQL, CSS, GraphQL, shell), including
SPDX-License-Identifier tags
- Set the root and cookie-banner LICENSE files to the MIT text with a
"MIT License" title line
- Switch the package.json license fields, Docker image label, and
cookie-banner README to MIT
- Update docs and the genmodels header generator accordingly
- Normalize copyright lines to a single format
(Copyright (c) <year(s)> Probo Inc <hello@probo.com>.): unify the
hello@getprobo.com and hello@probo.inc emails to hello@probo.com and
the comma-separated years to a hyphenated range
Genuine third-party references are intentionally left untouched: the
Lucide icon attributions (Lucide is ISC) and the trivy dependency
license allowlist.
Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
The Crisp ownership check returned a generic internal error when the
managed plugin token was unset without logging server side, unlike the
sibling plugin-ID branch and every other internal path in the file. A
deployment with the token unconfigured but the provider somehow surfaced
would produce an undiagnosable error. Log the condition first, mirroring
the plugin-ID branch.
Signed-off-by: Aurélien Sibiril <81782+aureliensibiril@users.noreply.github.com>
A managed (Model B) connector like Crisp needs both the Probo-held key
and a resource ID (the plugin ID) to connect, but the driver catalog
gated visibility on the key alone. A deployment that set the key without
the plugin ID (reachable through raw JSON config; the bootstrap env path
already requires both) would show Crisp as connectable and then fail
every attempt with an internal error.
Add a RequiresManagedResourceID flag to the registration and a
Registry.ManagedConnectorReady check that requires both before a managed
provider enters the catalog, so a half-configured provider stays hidden
instead of dead-ending at connect.
Signed-off-by: Aurélien Sibiril <81782+aureliensibiril@users.noreply.github.com>
Crisp is a managed (Model B) connector: Probo holds one plugin token
server-side and each connection carries only a Website ID. Nothing
stops one organization from entering another organization's Website
ID, so prove control of the website before creating the connection.
Probo derives a per-(organization, website) verification code as an
HMAC over the token secret and exposes it through a new
crispVerificationCode query. The customer pastes it into the Probo
plugin's per-website settings; at connect time the resolver reads the
setting back through the managed plugin token and requires a
constant-time match before any row is written. The managed key and
plugin ID come from bootstrap, so the connector stays hidden until the
deployment configures them.
The settings fetch is injected so the create-time gate's branch wiring
is unit-tested (mismatch and not-subscribed reject, internal errors
stay generic, a matching code passes), and the managed-versus-client
key resolution is covered too.
Signed-off-by: Aurélien Sibiril <81782+aureliensibiril@users.noreply.github.com>
Four API-key, single-tenant (Pattern 3) connectors:
- Scaleway: secret key in the X-Auth-Token header plus an Organization ID
setting; GET /iam/v1alpha1/users (owner/member, status, two-factor),
per-connection BuildProbeURL.
- Yousign: Bearer API key; GET /v3/users (admin/owner/member, is_active);
production host with a static probe.
- Railway: Bearer account token; GraphQL me{workspaces{members}} aggregated
and deduplicated across workspaces; custom probe, since Railway returns
HTTP 200 with an errors body on a rejected token.
- Crisp: plugin token as HTTP Basic (identifier:key) plus a Website ID
setting and the X-Crisp-Tier header; GET /v1/website/{id}/operators/list,
custom probe and name resolver.
Scaleway and Crisp carry a required extra setting, so the console add-source
dialog maps organizationId/websiteId onto their scalewayOrganizationId and
crispWebsiteId API-key inputs; without that mapping the value is silently
dropped and the create is rejected.
Cassette-backed driver tests plus unit tests for the cross-workspace
deduplication, the probe contracts and the role/MFA helpers.
Signed-off-by: Aurélien Sibiril <81782+aureliensibiril@users.noreply.github.com>
Build the public Updates pages in the compliance portal: a
cursor-paginated list of sent mailing-list updates and a detail view
for a single update, replacing the previous stub page.
Add a MailingListUpdate case to the trust API node resolver, guarded so
only SENT updates belonging to the current trust center's mailing list
are exposed, so the detail page can load an update by URL.
Add a Prev/Next Pagination primitive to the v2 UI kit. Page numbers are
omitted because cursor pagination cannot derive an ordinal page index;
each arrow only shows when its page exists while keeping its slot
reserved so a visible arrow never shifts position.
Relocate the shared MailingListUpdateListItem to its own component
folder and wrap each row in a link to the detail page, so both the home
recent-updates section and the list navigate to detail.
Signed-off-by: Émile Ré <emile@probo.com>
Address the review comments on the subprocessors work:
- Reject invalid category/country filter values in the Subprocessors
resolver with an INVALID error instead of relying solely on transport
coercion, so a malformed request fails fast and explicitly.
- Use pgx.StrictNamedArgs in the new distinct facet queries so missing
or extra SQL placeholders stay detectable, matching sibling queries.
- Default a nil ThirdPartyFilter at the service boundary to avoid a nil
dereference in the coredata list/count paths.
- Expose the category group label as an aria heading for assistive tech.
- Add the missing space in the Select "Selected:" story label.
Signed-off-by: Émile Ré <emile@probo.com>
The subprocessors toolbar derived its category and region filter
options client-side from a second, unfiltered subprocessors(first: 250)
fetch, shipping up to 250 rows purely to compute two small facet sets
and silently capping the options at that limit.
Expose subprocessorCategories and subprocessorCountries on TrustCenter,
each backed by a DISTINCT query over the organization's third parties
scoped to show_on_trust_center, and read them directly in the toolbar.
The page now issues one filtered list query plus two tiny arrays, and
the options only ever include values that can actually return results.
Signed-off-by: Émile Ré <emile@probo.com>
Subprocessor filtering for the compliance portal happens in the backend
rather than the client. Add a SubprocessorFilter (query, category,
country) to the trust API's subprocessors connection, thread it through
the resolver and service, and extend the coredata ThirdParty filter with
category equality and country array membership. The connection stores the
filter so totalCount reflects the filtered set. Add e2e coverage for the
new filtering.
On the frontend, convert the page to a refetchable fragment whose filter
arguments are driven by URL-persisted, debounced toolbar state (category
and region selects plus a search field), populate the dropdowns from an
unfiltered facet selection, and offer to clear filters from the empty
state.
Signed-off-by: Émile Ré <emile@probo.com>
Any self-provisioned trust center visitor could accept another
visitor's NDA signature or inject audit-trail events into it by
supplying its GID, since AcceptSignature and RecordEvent trusted the
client-supplied signature ID without checking it belonged to the
caller (GHSA-22xj-f767-ppw6). SignerEmail/ActorEmail are always
derived from the verified session identity, never client input, so
comparing them against the signature's stored SignerEmail in
pkg/esign/service.go closes the hole at its root without touching the
resolver-level authorization already in place elsewhere.
Adds an e2e regression test that self-provisions two trust center
visitors through the real magic-link flow and confirms one cannot
touch the other's signature.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@probo.com>
Drop the redundant embedded Resolver selector flagged by staticcheck
(QF1008) in the membership and organization permission resolvers, and
add the whitespace wsl_v5 expects around the attribute range loop and
the final return in permission.
Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
Replace the deny-based restriction on granting OWNER with role-scoped
allow policies so authorization fails closed: admins may create and
update memberships only when the assigned role is not OWNER, and the
absence of a target role no longer implies permission.
To keep console UI gating accurate without loosening the base grants,
the permission field gains an optional typed options argument
(PermissionOptionsInput) that forwards target_role into the dry-run
authorization. Only the two role-related console calls (create user,
update membership) pass it; the OWNER option stays hidden for admins via
the existing assignable-roles helper.
Add a non-regression test that an admin cannot promote a member to OWNER
while still being able to change members between non-owner roles.
An organization ADMIN could hard-remove members, including OWNERs, because
removeUser (connect and MCP) only checked the weaker iam:membership-profile:delete
gate. Authorize the owner-only iam:membership:delete instead, and expose the
source attribute on MembershipProfile so the owner grant's non-SCIM condition
can match.
Consolidate ownership-grant authorization into policy for both createUser and
updateMembership: each resolver passes the requested role as a target_role
attribute and ADMIN is denied granting ownership via deny-create-owner /
deny-promote-owner. target_role is distinct from resource.role, which is the
target's current role and guards editing existing owners. With no callers left,
the iam:membership-role:set-owner action (grant and OAuth2 scope) is removed.
Also pass the authorized scope through to the RemoveUser/CreateUser services,
gate the console Remove action on iam:membership:delete, and add regression
tests plus a changelog entry.
Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
The DocumentVersionSignatureFilter exposed a field named `state` that
actually filters on the signatory's profile state, which was ambiguous
next to the signature `states` field. Rename it to `profileState`
(GraphQL) / `profile_state` (MCP) across the schema, spec, resolvers,
console app, and n8n node for clarity.
Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
The public trust API derived its authorization scope from client-supplied
global IDs, so a visitor on one trust center could resolve nodes, export
audit-report PDFs, and read or mutate electronic signatures belonging to
another organization (cross-tenant access).
Every trust API resolver now derives its scope from the active compliance
page's organization via compliancepage.ScopeFromContext, so reads are always
confined to the page's tenant. Cross-tenant or unknown IDs surface as
not-found instead of leaking data or returning a 500. Active/presence is
enforced upstream by the id and presence middlewares.
esign's signature operations (GetSignatureByID, AcceptSignature, RecordEvent)
now take a caller-provided scope instead of deriving one from the requested
ID, so signature reads and mutations are tenant-scoped at the source. This
removes the need for a resolver-level authorization helper; RecordEvent also
verifies signature ownership within scope before recording, since the event
foreign key is not tenant-composite.
Adds e2e non-regression tests covering owning vs. foreign trust center report
export and the generic node(id:) resolver.
Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
Several HTTP entry points still parsed RemoteAddr directly, so behind
a layer-7 proxy they recorded the load balancer IP instead of the
signer's. Route NDA acceptance, signing events, document sign/approve,
and session updates through clientip.Extract, which honors Forwarded
and X-Forwarded-For when trustedproxy allows them.
Signed-off-by: Ludovic Vielle <ludovic@probo.com>
An organization ADMIN could mint an OWNER membership via createUser, which
only gated iam:membership-profile:create and bypassed the owner-only
iam:membership-role:set-owner check that updateMembership already enforces.
Gate the requested role in both createUser entry points (connect resolver
and the MCP CreateUserTool) with an additional set-owner authorization when
the role is OWNER, mirroring updateMembership. Add a regression test that
locks the ADMIN/OWNER privilege boundary the fix relies on.
Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
Add a resource-oriented set of webhook events for the document
lifecycle. Each event carries the document plus only the sub-resource
it concerns (version, signature or approval).
Events:
- document.created / updated / archived / unarchived / deleted
- document.version.created / updated / published / rejected / deleted
- document.version.signature.requested / signed / cancelled
- document.version.approval.requested / approved / rejected / voided
Wires the new types through the migration, Go enum, GraphQL schema,
CLI, n8n nodes and the console webhooks settings UI.
Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
Deleting a profile still referenced elsewhere (for example as an
asset owner) surfaced an internal error. PostgreSQL reports ON DELETE
RESTRICT blocks as SQLSTATE 23001, not 23503; map both in profile
delete and propagate ErrProfileInUse through removeUser as CONFLICT.
Signed-off-by: Ludovic Vielle <ludovic@probo.com>
The GraphQL endpoint built its gqlgen server with bare handler.New and
no limits, so a single request with thousands of aliased resolver calls
was parsed, validated, executed, and marshalled in full. Under load this
let an unauthenticated client drive excessive CPU and memory use against
POST /api/connect/v1/graphql and the console and trust endpoints, which
share the same constructor (GHSA-prh2-g8pv-m7p9).
Add configurable guards in the shared gqlutils.NewHandler: a parser
token limit rejects oversized queries at lex time before any execution,
a fixed complexity limit caps field-selection count, an LRU query cache
avoids repeated parsing, and field suggestions are disabled. The limits
flow from a new APIConfig.GraphQL section through server and api config
into all three GraphQL handlers, with PROBOD_API_GRAPHQL_* env vars and
Helm values exposed for per-environment tuning.
Defaults are sized with generous headroom over real traffic: the parser
token limit (15000) and complexity limit (2000) sit far above the
largest legitimate frontend query yet well below the proof-of-concept
flood, so normal usage is unaffected while floods are rejected cheaply.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@probo.com>
Add Pylon, OpenRouter, incident.io and Brevo as access-review connectors.
All are API-key, single-tenant providers (Pattern 3): the key identifies
one tenant, so there is no OAuth flow, picker UI, or bootstrap/helm
configuration.
- Pylon: Bearer token, GET /users; resolves each user's opaque role_id to
a role name via GET /user-roles, with cursor pagination.
- OpenRouter: Bearer management key, GET /api/v1/organization/members. The
endpoint requires an organization account -- a personal key authenticates
but returns 404 -- so the connection probe rejects 404 on top of 401/403
(doProbeRequest gained an opt-in extra-reject set) to surface a non-org
key at connect time instead of mid-campaign.
- incident.io: Bearer token, GET /v2/users. Its OAuth is outbound-only, so
the API key is the inbound path; live base_role/custom_roles take
precedence over the deprecated role enum.
- Brevo: API key in the api-key header (Registration.APIKeyHeader), GET
/v3/organization/invited/users. A live recording corrected the documented
schema: is_owner is a JSON boolean (not a string) and an id field is
present, so it is used as the stable ExternalID.
The OpenRouter and Brevo cassettes are anonymized live recordings; Pylon
and incident.io use hand-authored fixtures (no self-serve test tenant). The
shared three-valued active-status mapping is consolidated into
activeFromStatus in driver.go.
Each adds the enum value, migration, GraphQL binding, provider
Registration, a driver with a cassette-driven test, and a brand logo.
Signed-off-by: Aurélien Sibiril <81782+aureliensibiril@users.noreply.github.com>
DocuSign approved our partner integration, so the connector can now
complete a real OAuth2 authorization-code flow. The integration key
has PKCE enabled, so RequiresPKCE is set; the confidential grant still
authenticates the token exchange with Basic auth and replays the
verifier as the documented hardening layer.
A DocuSign user may have access to several accounts, so this replaces
the previous auto-default-account behavior with a Pattern-1 picker:
the user chooses the account after OAuth, the choice is stored on
DocuSignConnectorSettings, and the driver and name resolver resolve
the selected account's data-center base URI from /oauth/userinfo.
Other changes:
- Request the extended scope so the refresh token's 30-day window
rolls on each use; without it the token hard-expires 30 days after
consent and breaks the connection.
- Drop API-key support: DocuSign has no static API key, only OAuth.
- Return ("", nil) from the name resolver on terminal failures so the
source-name worker does not retry a revoked token forever.
- Add a driver test and cassette; the test previously skipped in CI
for lack of a cassette.
Signed-off-by: Aurélien Sibiril <81782+aureliensibiril@users.noreply.github.com>
Add Mercury, Apollo.io, Deepgram, ClickHouse Cloud, and Langfuse as
access-review connectors. All are API-key, single-tenant providers
(Pattern 3): the key identifies one tenant, so there is no OAuth flow,
picker UI, or bootstrap/helm configuration.
- Mercury: Bearer token, GET /api/v1/users, cursor pagination.
- Apollo.io: x-api-key header, GET /api/v1/users/search (teammates).
- Deepgram: Token scheme; lists members across every project and
dedupes by member_id, unioning per-project scopes.
- ClickHouse Cloud: HTTP Basic (keyId:keySecret); discovers the org
via GET /v1/organizations, then lists its members.
- Langfuse: HTTP Basic (publicKey:secretKey); a base-URL setting
selects the regional cloud host or a self-hosted instance.
Each adds the enum value, migration, GraphQL binding, provider
Registration, a driver with a cassette-driven test, and a brand logo.
Signed-off-by: Aurélien Sibiril <81782+aureliensibiril@users.noreply.github.com>
The API-key connection transport could present a key as a Bearer token,
an x-api-key header, a custom scheme (SSWS/Token), or HTTP Basic with an
empty password (Cursor). None of these can carry a real password, which
providers such as ClickHouse Cloud (keyId:keySecret) and Langfuse
(publicKey:secretKey) require.
Add a fourth mode, APIKeyBasicAuthUserPass, that base64-encodes the
stored "username:password" credential verbatim into Authorization: Basic.
SetBasicAuth cannot express this -- it re-appends a ":" and corrupts the
credential. The mode is wired generically through the registry and the
create-connector resolver and is mutually exclusive with the other
API-key auth modes.
Signed-off-by: Aurélien Sibiril <81782+aureliensibiril@users.noreply.github.com>
Requesting a signature only validated that the version was PUBLISHED, so a
signature could be requested on a superseded (older) published version. Reject
versions that are not the document's current published major/minor, and hide
the request button in the console for non-current versions.
Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
Introduce BearerChallengeMiddleware on MCP, Console and Connect GraphQL, Files, and OAuth2 userinfo. Call sites record challenge intent in context via NoteUnauthenticated, NoteInvalidToken, and NoteInsufficientScope; the middleware applies resource_metadata, invalid_token, and insufficient_scope on WriteHeader.
OAuth2 access token middleware flags rejected Bearer tokens for invalid_token challenges. Add Authorizer.ScopesForAction for the scope auth-param.
Signed-off-by: Ludovic Vielle <ludovic@probo.com>
The trust node query previously accepted a String and resolved both GIDs
and slugs through one field, which forced the frontend to lose the ID
type guarantee. Restore node(id: ID!) as a strict GID lookup and add a
dedicated aliasedNode(alias: String!) that parses a GID first and falls
back to slug resolution before delegating to Node.
Inline the former nodeByGID switch directly into Node and drop the helper
file. Point the trust DocumentPage query at aliasedNode so slug-or-ID URLs
keep working.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@probo.com>
Rename the resolver helper to ResourceAliasResolver so it reads as a
resolver rather than a storage-resource-specific accessor, and update
its three call sites in the trust center resolvers.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@probo.com>
Rename the setTrustCenterAlias and removeTrustCenterAlias MCP tools to
setResourceAlias and removeResourceAlias, backed by the resourcealias
service.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@probo.com>
Switch the trust center API to resolve aliased nodes via the
resourcealias service instead of the trust-center-specific alias
resolvers.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@probo.com>
Drop the setTrustCenterAlias and removeTrustCenterAlias mutations and
the alias field on Audit in favor of generic setResourceAlias and
removeResourceAlias mutations backed by the resourcealias service.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@probo.com>
Introduce a standalone resourcealias package with its own service,
IAM policies, and OAuth2 scopes so alias management no longer lives
inside the trust center services. Remove the trust-center-specific
alias services from probo and trust, and wire the new service into
probod, the server, and the API layer.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@probo.com>
The audit alias resolver returned raw service errors. Log them
and return gqlutils.Internal like other resolvers in the file.
Remove-only users could edit the alias field to a new value that
was never saved. Reset local state when set permission is missing,
and catch mutation rejections on blur.
Sitemap generation appended audit report file IDs without
deduplication, which could emit duplicate document URLs when
multiple audits share the same report file.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@probo.com>
Node lookup now accepts an alias slug in addition to a GID, resolving
it against the organization's alias table before dispatching. Adds
alias fields to Document, AuditReport, and TrustCenterFile.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@probo.com>
Adds an alias field to Document, Audit, and TrustCenterFile types.
Introduces setTrustCenterAlias and removeTrustCenterAlias mutations
with proper authorization and error handling.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@probo.com>
Replace pkg/iam/scopeset with pkg/iam/oauth2scope.Registry, a shared
OAuth2 scope→action registry used by the authorizer, OAuth2 service,
and Connect API. Registration stays open until probod calls Freeze();
read paths (RegisteredScopes, Allows, ValidateScopes) panic before
that.
Drop the leaky APIScopes surface and AllowedAPIScopes on manual
access-token creation in favor of registry.ValidateScopes. Metadata,
protected-resource metadata, and CIMD scope lists are built from
RegisteredScopes() via helpers in pkg/iam/oauth2/scopes.go. Expose
oauth2ScopesSupported as an OAuth2Scope GraphQL scalar.
Signed-off-by: Ludovic Vielle <ludovic@probo.com>
