A client can prepend a spoofed entry to X-Forwarded-For before
the request reaches our load balancer. Taking the first value
would return the attacker's address. Since we sit behind a
single trusted LB that appends the real client IP as the last
entry, switch to rightmost extraction for both X-Forwarded-For
and RFC 7239 Forwarded headers.
Signed-off-by: Émile Ré <emile@getprobo.com>
Strip forwarded headers (Forwarded, X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-Ip)
from requests originating from untrusted proxies at the HTTP
server level, reusing the existing proxy-protocol trusted-proxies
config. The clientip package is now a pure extraction helper;
context plumbing and middleware wrappers are removed.
Signed-off-by: Émile Ré <emile@getprobo.com>