Add trust center OAuth connect e2e coverage

Extend test helpers for portal OAuth flows and cover connect,
callback, and NDA signing against the compliance portal API.

Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@probo.com>
This commit is contained in:
Bryan Frimin
2026-07-15 10:59:43 +02:00
parent 27e012e47a
commit de203325d2
5 changed files with 393 additions and 54 deletions

View File

@@ -24,9 +24,11 @@ import (
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/cookiejar"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -53,16 +55,19 @@ const (
)
type Client struct {
T testing.TB
httpClient *http.Client
baseURL string
mailpitBaseURL string
role TestRole
userID gid.GID
profileID gid.GID
organizationID gid.GID
email string
password string
T testing.TB
httpClient *http.Client
proboHTTPClient *http.Client
trustClient *http.Client
trustHost string
baseURL string
mailpitBaseURL string
role TestRole
userID gid.GID
profileID gid.GID
organizationID gid.GID
email string
password string
}
func NewClient(t testing.TB, role TestRole) *Client {
@@ -544,11 +549,7 @@ func NewClientWithNewSession(t testing.TB, from *Client) *Client {
return client
}
// SelfProvisionTrustCenterVisitor signs a brand-new email up as a trust
// center visitor through the public magic-link flow (send + verify), the
// same path a real visitor takes. It returns a Client bound to that
// visitor's own session and cookie jar, scoped to no organization.
func SelfProvisionTrustCenterVisitor(t testing.TB, trustCenterID string) *Client {
func SelfProvisionTrustCenterVisitor(t testing.TB, trustHost string) *Client {
t.Helper()
jar, err := cookiejar.New(nil)
@@ -561,47 +562,170 @@ func SelfProvisionTrustCenterVisitor(t testing.TB, trustCenterID string) *Client
baseURL: GetBaseURL(),
mailpitBaseURL: GetMailpitBaseURL(),
email: email,
trustHost: trustHost,
httpClient: &http.Client{
Jar: jar,
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
},
trustClient: trustHTTPClientWithJar(trustHost, jar),
proboHTTPClient: &http.Client{
Jar: jar,
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
},
}
visitor.sendMagicLink(trustCenterID, email)
token := visitor.pollForLinkToken(fmt.Sprintf("to:%s", email))
visitor.verifyMagicLink(trustCenterID, token)
visitor.connectViaCIMD(email)
return visitor
}
func (c *Client) sendMagicLink(trustCenterID, email string) {
const query = `
mutation($input: SendMagicLinkInput!) {
sendMagicLink(input: $input) {
success
}
}
`
func (c *Client) connectViaCIMD(email string) {
c.T.Helper()
err := c.ExecuteTrust(trustCenterID, query, map[string]any{
"input": map[string]any{"email": email},
}, nil)
require.NoError(c.T, err, "sendMagicLink mutation failed")
WaitForTrustCenterHTTPS(c.T, c.trustHost)
initiateURL := fmt.Sprintf(
"https://%s/initiate?continue=/overview",
c.trustHost,
)
authorizeURL := c.redirectLocation(c.trustClient, initiateURL)
require.NotEmpty(c.T, authorizeURL, "oauth initiate must redirect to authorize")
portalLoginURL := c.redirectLocation(c.proboHTTPClient, authorizeURL)
require.Contains(c.T, portalLoginURL, "/auth/portal-login", "unauthenticated authorize must redirect to portal login")
authorizeParam := extractAuthorizeQueryParam(portalLoginURL)
require.NotEmpty(c.T, authorizeParam)
c.postConnectMagicLink(email, authorizeParam)
token := c.pollForLinkToken(fmt.Sprintf("to:%s", email))
verifyURL := c.baseURL + "/api/connect/v1/magic-link/verify?token=" + url.QueryEscape(token)
resumeAuthorizeURL := c.redirectLocation(c.proboHTTPClient, verifyURL)
require.Contains(c.T, resumeAuthorizeURL, "/api/connect/v1/oauth2/authorize")
authorizeResp := c.redirectHTTPResponse(c.proboHTTPClient, resumeAuthorizeURL)
require.False(
c.T,
IsConsentRedirect(authorizeResp),
"compliance portal CIMD must skip oauth consent screen",
)
require.Equal(c.T, http.StatusFound, authorizeResp.StatusCode)
_, err := OAuth2AuthorizeCodeFromRedirect(authorizeResp)
require.NoError(c.T, err, "compliance portal CIMD must issue authorization code without consent")
callbackURL := resolveRedirectURL(resumeAuthorizeURL, authorizeResp.Header.Get("Location"))
require.Contains(c.T, callbackURL, "/callback")
finalURL := c.redirectLocation(c.trustClient, callbackURL)
require.True(
c.T,
strings.HasSuffix(finalURL, "/overview") || strings.Contains(finalURL, "/overview"),
"oauth callback must redirect to continue URL, got %q",
finalURL,
)
}
func (c *Client) verifyMagicLink(trustCenterID, token string) {
const query = `
mutation($input: VerifyMagicLinkInput!) {
verifyMagicLink(input: $input) {
continue
}
}
`
func (c *Client) postConnectMagicLink(email, authorizeParam string) {
c.T.Helper()
err := c.ExecuteTrust(trustCenterID, query, map[string]any{
"input": map[string]any{"token": token},
}, nil)
require.NoError(c.T, err, "verifyMagicLink mutation failed")
body := url.Values{}
body.Set("email", email)
body.Set("authorize", authorizeParam)
req, err := http.NewRequest(
"POST",
c.baseURL+"/api/connect/v1/magic-link/send",
strings.NewReader(body.Encode()),
)
require.NoError(c.T, err)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
resp, err := c.proboHTTPClient.Do(req)
require.NoError(c.T, err, "magic-link send request failed")
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
require.Equal(c.T, http.StatusNoContent, resp.StatusCode, "magic-link send must return 204")
}
func (c *Client) redirectLocation(client *http.Client, rawURL string) string {
c.T.Helper()
resp := c.redirectHTTPResponse(client, rawURL)
require.True(
c.T,
resp.StatusCode >= http.StatusMultipleChoices && resp.StatusCode < http.StatusBadRequest,
"expected redirect from %s, got %d",
rawURL,
resp.StatusCode,
)
location := resp.Header.Get("Location")
require.NotEmpty(c.T, location, "redirect from %s missing Location header", rawURL)
return resolveRedirectURL(rawURL, location)
}
func (c *Client) redirectHTTPResponse(client *http.Client, rawURL string) *OAuth2HTTPResponse {
c.T.Helper()
noRedirectClient := &http.Client{
Jar: client.Jar,
Timeout: client.Timeout,
Transport: client.Transport,
CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
return http.ErrUseLastResponse
},
}
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, rawURL, nil)
require.NoError(c.T, err)
resp, err := noRedirectClient.Do(req)
require.NoError(c.T, err, "request to %s failed", rawURL)
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
require.NoError(c.T, err)
return &OAuth2HTTPResponse{
StatusCode: resp.StatusCode,
Header: resp.Header,
Body: body,
}
}
func resolveRedirectURL(baseURL, location string) string {
locURL, err := url.Parse(location)
if err != nil {
return location
}
if locURL.IsAbs() {
return locURL.String()
}
base, err := url.Parse(baseURL)
if err != nil {
return location
}
return base.ResolveReference(locURL).String()
}
func extractAuthorizeQueryParam(portalLoginURL string) string {
parsed, err := url.Parse(portalLoginURL)
if err != nil {
return ""
}
return parsed.Query().Get("authorize")
}
func (c *Client) GetEmail() string {

View File

@@ -219,9 +219,14 @@ func ConsoleGraphQLWithAccessToken(
// page's host as TLS SNI. Certificates are Pebble-issued for e2e, so
// verification is skipped.
func trustHTTPClient(serverName string) *http.Client {
return trustHTTPClientWithJar(serverName, nil)
}
func trustHTTPClientWithJar(serverName string, jar http.CookieJar) *http.Client {
dialer := &net.Dialer{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}
return &http.Client{
Jar: jar,
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
Transport: &http.Transport{
DialContext: func(ctx context.Context, _, _ string) (net.Conn, error) {
@@ -235,6 +240,36 @@ func trustHTTPClient(serverName string) *http.Client {
}
}
// WaitForTrustCenterHTTPS blocks until the dedicated trust-center listener
// serves the page over TLS. Managed domains provision certificates
// asynchronously after activation.
func WaitForTrustCenterHTTPS(t testing.TB, host string) {
t.Helper()
client := TrustHTTPClient(host)
require.Eventually(
t,
func() bool {
resp, err := client.Get("https://" + host + complianceportalOAuthMetadataPath())
if err != nil {
return false
}
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
return resp.StatusCode == http.StatusOK
},
30*time.Second,
500*time.Millisecond,
"trust center did not become servable on the dedicated listener",
)
}
func complianceportalOAuthMetadataPath() string {
return "/.well-known/oauth-client-metadata"
}
// DoTrust posts a GraphQL query to a compliance page served on the dedicated
// listener. host is the page's serving domain (a customer custom domain or a
// managed {slug}.probopage.localhost subdomain).
@@ -249,7 +284,7 @@ func (c *Client) DoTrust(host string, query string, variables map[string]any) (*
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot marshal request: %w", err)
}
endpoint := fmt.Sprintf("https://%s/api/trust/v1/graphql", host)
endpoint := fmt.Sprintf("https://%s/graphql", host)
req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", endpoint, bytes.NewReader(body))
if err != nil {
@@ -258,7 +293,12 @@ func (c *Client) DoTrust(host string, query string, variables map[string]any) (*
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
resp, err := trustHTTPClient(host).Do(req)
client := trustHTTPClient(host)
if c.trustClient != nil && host == c.trustHost {
client = c.trustClient
}
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("request failed: %w", err)
}
@@ -353,6 +393,10 @@ func (c *Client) BaseURL() string {
return c.baseURL
}
func TrustHTTPClient(trustHost string) *http.Client {
return trustHTTPClient(trustHost)
}
type UploadFile struct {
Filename string
ContentType string

View File

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
package trust_test
import (
"net/url"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
@@ -58,6 +59,42 @@ func lookupTrustCenterID(t *testing.T, owner *testutil.Client) string {
return result.Node.TrustCenter.ID
}
func lookupTrustHost(t *testing.T, owner *testutil.Client, trustCenterID string) string {
t.Helper()
activateTrustCenter(t, owner, trustCenterID)
const query = `
query($organizationId: ID!) {
node(id: $organizationId) {
... on Organization {
trustCenter { publicUrl }
}
}
}
`
var result struct {
Node struct {
TrustCenter struct {
PublicURL string `json:"publicUrl"`
} `json:"trustCenter"`
} `json:"node"`
}
err := owner.Execute(query, map[string]any{
"organizationId": owner.GetOrganizationID().String(),
}, &result)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotEmpty(t, result.Node.TrustCenter.PublicURL)
publicURL, err := url.Parse(result.Node.TrustCenter.PublicURL)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotEmpty(t, publicURL.Host)
return publicURL.Host
}
// activateTrustCenter flips the trust center to active so its public surface
// (NDA, subprocessors, reports, branding) becomes reachable by visitors.
func activateTrustCenter(t *testing.T, owner *testutil.Client, trustCenterID string) {

View File

@@ -60,12 +60,12 @@ func TestTrustCenter_AcceptElectronicSignature_RejectsForeignSignature(t *testin
trustCenterID := lookupTrustCenterID(t, owner)
uploadTrustCenterNDA(t, owner, trustCenterID)
activateTrustCenter(t, owner, trustCenterID)
trustHost := lookupTrustHost(t, owner, trustCenterID)
victim := testutil.SelfProvisionTrustCenterVisitor(t, trustCenterID)
attacker := testutil.SelfProvisionTrustCenterVisitor(t, trustCenterID)
victim := testutil.SelfProvisionTrustCenterVisitor(t, trustHost)
attacker := testutil.SelfProvisionTrustCenterVisitor(t, trustHost)
victimSignatureID, victimSignatureStatus := viewerSignature(t, victim, trustCenterID)
victimSignatureID, victimSignatureStatus := viewerSignature(t, victim, trustHost)
require.NotEmpty(t, victimSignatureID)
require.Equal(t, "PENDING", victimSignatureStatus)
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ func TestTrustCenter_AcceptElectronicSignature_RejectsForeignSignature(t *testin
}
`
err := attacker.ExecuteTrust(trustCenterID, acceptMutation, map[string]any{
err := attacker.ExecuteTrust(trustHost, acceptMutation, map[string]any{
"input": map[string]any{"signatureId": victimSignatureID},
}, nil)
require.Error(t, err, "attacker must not be able to accept another visitor's signature")
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ func TestTrustCenter_AcceptElectronicSignature_RejectsForeignSignature(t *testin
}
`
err = attacker.ExecuteTrust(trustCenterID, recordEventMutation, map[string]any{
err = attacker.ExecuteTrust(trustHost, recordEventMutation, map[string]any{
"input": map[string]any{
"signatureId": victimSignatureID,
"eventType": "DOCUMENT_VIEWED",
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ func TestTrustCenter_AcceptElectronicSignature_RejectsForeignSignature(t *testin
require.Error(t, err, "attacker must not be able to inject events into another visitor's signature")
assertForbidden(t, err)
_, statusAfterAttack := viewerSignature(t, victim, trustCenterID)
_, statusAfterAttack := viewerSignature(t, victim, trustHost)
assert.Equal(t, "PENDING", statusAfterAttack, "attack attempts must not have mutated the victim's signature")
var acceptResult struct {
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ func TestTrustCenter_AcceptElectronicSignature_RejectsForeignSignature(t *testin
} `json:"acceptElectronicSignature"`
}
err = victim.ExecuteTrust(trustCenterID, acceptMutation, map[string]any{
err = victim.ExecuteTrust(trustHost, acceptMutation, map[string]any{
"input": map[string]any{"signatureId": victimSignatureID},
}, &acceptResult)
require.NoError(t, err, "the legitimate signer must still be able to accept their own signature")
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ func uploadTrustCenterNDA(t *testing.T, owner *testutil.Client, trustCenterID st
require.NoError(t, err)
}
func viewerSignature(t *testing.T, visitor *testutil.Client, trustCenterID string) (string, string) {
func viewerSignature(t *testing.T, visitor *testutil.Client, trustHost string) (string, string) {
t.Helper()
const query = `
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ func viewerSignature(t *testing.T, visitor *testutil.Client, trustCenterID strin
} `json:"currentTrustCenter"`
}
err := visitor.ExecuteTrust(trustCenterID, query, nil, &result)
err := visitor.ExecuteTrust(trustHost, query, nil, &result)
require.NoError(t, err)
sig := result.CurrentTrustCenter.NonDisclosureAgreement.ViewerSignature

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Probo Inc <hello@probo.com>.
//
// Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
// purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
// copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
//
// THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH
// REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
// AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT,
// INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM
// LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR
// OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
// PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
package trust_test
import (
"encoding/json"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"go.probo.inc/probo/e2e/internal/testutil"
)
func TestTrustCenter_CIMDMetadataDocument(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
owner := testutil.NewClient(t, testutil.RoleOwner)
trustCenterID := lookupTrustCenterID(t, owner)
trustHost := lookupTrustHost(t, owner, trustCenterID)
testutil.WaitForTrustCenterHTTPS(t, trustHost)
client := testutil.TrustHTTPClient(trustHost)
resp, err := client.Get("https://" + trustHost + "/.well-known/oauth-client-metadata")
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, resp.StatusCode)
body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
require.NoError(t, err)
var doc struct {
ClientID string `json:"client_id"`
ClientName string `json:"client_name"`
RedirectURIs []string `json:"redirect_uris"`
TokenEndpointAuthMethod string `json:"token_endpoint_auth_method"`
GrantTypes []string `json:"grant_types"`
ResponseTypes []string `json:"response_types"`
}
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(body, &doc))
assert.Equal(
t,
"https://"+trustHost+"/.well-known/oauth-client-metadata",
doc.ClientID,
)
assert.Equal(
t,
[]string{"https://" + trustHost + "/callback"},
doc.RedirectURIs,
)
assert.Equal(t, "none", doc.TokenEndpointAuthMethod)
assert.Contains(t, doc.GrantTypes, "authorization_code")
assert.Equal(t, []string{"code"}, doc.ResponseTypes)
assert.NotEmpty(t, doc.ClientName)
}
func TestTrustCenter_VisitorConnectViaCIMD(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
owner := testutil.NewClient(t, testutil.RoleOwner)
trustCenterID := lookupTrustCenterID(t, owner)
trustHost := lookupTrustHost(t, owner, trustCenterID)
visitor := testutil.SelfProvisionTrustCenterVisitor(t, trustHost)
const query = `
query {
currentTrustCenter {
title
}
}
`
var result struct {
CurrentTrustCenter struct {
Title string `json:"title"`
} `json:"currentTrustCenter"`
}
err := visitor.ExecuteTrust(trustHost, query, nil, &result)
require.NoError(t, err, "visitor session must authenticate trust GraphQL after CIMD connect")
assert.NotEmpty(t, result.CurrentTrustCenter.Title)
}
func TestTrustCenter_UnknownCIMDClientRejected(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
owner := testutil.NewClient(t, testutil.RoleOwner)
_, challenge := testutil.GeneratePKCE()
clientID := "https://unknown-cimd.example.com/.well-known/oauth-client-metadata"
resp, err := testutil.OAuth2Authorize(owner, url.Values{
"client_id": {clientID},
"redirect_uri": {"https://unknown-cimd.example.com/callback"},
"response_type": {"code"},
"scope": {"openid profile email"},
"state": {"rejected"},
"code_challenge": {challenge},
"code_challenge_method": {"S256"},
"nonce": {"test-nonce"},
})
require.NoError(t, err)
require.False(
t,
testutil.IsConsentRedirect(resp),
"unknown CIMD client must not reach consent screen",
)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, resp.StatusCode)
var oauthErr struct {
Code string `json:"error"`
}
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(resp.Body, &oauthErr))
assert.Equal(t, "invalid_client", oauthErr.Code)
}