Close cert provisioning correctness gaps
Several race and validity gaps could leave certificate provisioning stuck, unusable, or noisy: - Accept the HTTP-01 challenge only after the key authorization is committed, so the CA cannot hit the token before this instance can serve it and invalidate the order. - Persist challenge metadata under a blocking write-back lock; a row merely locked by a competing transaction no longer silently drops the accepted order. - Abandon a recovered VALID order and restart instead of issuing it with a freshly generated key that cannot match the existing cert. - Exclude rate-limited rows from the ten-minute stale reset so the resumable order survives the ACME cooldown. - Size the provisioning poll lease to exceed the max processing window so a released claim lock cannot let another worker process the same row concurrently. - Parse Retry-After as unsigned seconds and clamp overflow so malformed values fall back to the default cooldown instead of disabling it. - Normalize the acme_errors problem_type label to the RFC 8555 set to bound Prometheus cardinality. Signed-off-by: Bryan Frimin <bryan@probo.com>
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@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ package certmanager
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import (
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"math"
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"net/http"
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"strconv"
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"time"
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@@ -72,11 +73,6 @@ func (e *ACMEError) Is(target error) bool {
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return e != nil && e.rateLimited && target == ErrACMERateLimited
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}
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// RetryAfter returns how long callers should wait before retrying.
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// For rate-limited errors it honors the ACME Retry-After value whenever the
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// header is present and parseable — including a zero (or past) value, which the
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// CA uses to permit an immediate retry. It falls back to defaultCooldown only
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// when the header is absent or invalid. Non-rate-limited errors return 0.
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func (e *ACMEError) RetryAfter() time.Duration {
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if e == nil || !e.rateLimited {
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return 0
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@@ -131,10 +127,6 @@ func newACMEError(op string, err error) *ACMEError {
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if _, ok := acme.RateLimit(acmeErr); ok {
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out.rateLimited = true
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// acme.RateLimit collapses "Retry-After: 0", an invalid header, and a
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// missing header all to a zero duration, so inspect the header directly
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// to tell an explicit zero (immediate retry) apart from an absent one
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// (fall back to defaultCooldown in RetryAfter).
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if retryAfter, ok := parseRetryAfter(acmeErr.Header); ok {
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out.retryAfter = retryAfter
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out.retryAfterSet = true
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@@ -158,7 +150,17 @@ func parseRetryAfter(header http.Header) (time.Duration, bool) {
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return 0, false
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}
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if seconds, err := strconv.Atoi(value); err == nil {
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// The delta-seconds form is an unsigned decimal integer (RFC 9110 §10.2.3).
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// Parsing it as unsigned rejects negative or otherwise malformed values so
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// they fall back to the caller's default cooldown instead of collapsing to a
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// zero/negative duration that would disable the rate-limit cooldown. A value
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// larger than time.Duration can hold is clamped to the maximum duration.
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if seconds, err := strconv.ParseUint(value, 10, 64); err == nil {
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maxSeconds := uint64(math.MaxInt64 / int64(time.Second))
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if seconds > maxSeconds {
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return time.Duration(math.MaxInt64), true
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}
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return time.Duration(seconds) * time.Second, true
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}
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