diff --git a/pkg/agent/guardrail/prompt_injection.go b/pkg/agent/guardrail/prompt_injection.go
index d100934ff..1ed0a0dc9 100644
--- a/pkg/agent/guardrail/prompt_injection.go
+++ b/pkg/agent/guardrail/prompt_injection.go
@@ -56,7 +56,9 @@ func (g *PromptInjectionGuardrail) Check(ctx context.Context, messages []llm.Mes
 		return &agent.GuardrailResult{Tripwire: false}, nil
 	}
 
-	resp, err := g.client.ChatCompletion(ctx, &llm.ChatCompletionRequest{
+	resp, err := g.client.ChatCompletion(
+		ctx,
+		&llm.ChatCompletionRequest{
 		Model: "gpt-4o-mini",
 		Messages: []llm.Message{
 			{
@@ -70,12 +72,15 @@ func (g *PromptInjectionGuardrail) Check(ctx context.Context, messages []llm.Mes
 		},
 		MaxTokens:   new(10),
 		Temperature: new(0.0),
-	})
+	},
+	)
 	if err != nil {
 		// If the classifier fails, allow the message through rather than
 		// blocking legitimate users. The system prompt hardening and
 		// tool-level authorization provide defense in depth.
-		g.logger.WarnCtx(ctx, "prompt injection classifier failed, allowing message through",
+		g.logger.WarnCtx(
+			ctx,
+			"prompt injection classifier failed, allowing message through",
 			log.Error(err),
 		)
 		return &agent.GuardrailResult{Tripwire: false}, nil