Fix advertised scopes for oauth protected resources

Signed-off-by: Ludovic Vielle <ludovic@probo.com>
This commit is contained in:
Ludovic Vielle
2026-06-25 10:21:47 +02:00
parent 38b6bbf4b5
commit 2ba8464d4e
6 changed files with 12 additions and 9 deletions

View File

@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ Scopes are namespace- or product-level only — no resource segments (e.g. `v1:p
**Discovery:** **Discovery:**
- Authorization server (RFC 8414): `scopes_supported` on `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server` lists OIDC + all API scopes; `protected_resources` links to the resource metadata document - Authorization server (RFC 8414): `scopes_supported` on `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server` lists OIDC + all API scopes; `protected_resources` links to the resource metadata document
- Protected resource (RFC 9728): `scopes_supported` on `/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource` lists `openid` plus API scopes - Protected resource (RFC 9728): `scopes_supported` on `/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource` lists `openid` plus write API scopes only (no `:read` suffix); matches CIMD client registration
**Enforcement:** OAuth2 bearer-token requests carry the validated access token on the request context (`pkg/iam/oauth2/request_context.go`). Before IAM policy evaluation, `iam.Authorizer` checks registered `oauth2scope.Registry` mappings via `Registry.Allows`. Each domain package exports `OAuth2ScopeMappings` in its `oauth2_scopes.go`; `probod` registers all domain mappings on the shared registry before `iam.NewService`. The check uses explicit scope→action lists — no `:read` / `:get` heuristics at enforcement time. Session, personal API key, and SCIM auth skip the check (no access token on context). Unmapped IAM actions **deny** OAuth requests (fail closed). Enforcement reads scopes from the access token directly. **Enforcement:** OAuth2 bearer-token requests carry the validated access token on the request context (`pkg/iam/oauth2/request_context.go`). Before IAM policy evaluation, `iam.Authorizer` checks registered `oauth2scope.Registry` mappings via `Registry.Allows`. Each domain package exports `OAuth2ScopeMappings` in its `oauth2_scopes.go`; `probod` registers all domain mappings on the shared registry before `iam.NewService`. The check uses explicit scope→action lists — no `:read` / `:get` heuristics at enforcement time. Session, personal API key, and SCIM auth skip the check (no access token on context). Unmapped IAM actions **deny** OAuth requests (fail closed). Enforcement reads scopes from the access token directly.

View File

@@ -114,7 +114,8 @@ func TestOAuth2_ProtectedResourceMetadata(t *testing.T) {
assert.Contains(t, metadata.AuthorizationServers, expectedResource) assert.Contains(t, metadata.AuthorizationServers, expectedResource)
assert.Contains(t, metadata.BearerMethodsSupported, "header") assert.Contains(t, metadata.BearerMethodsSupported, "header")
assert.Contains(t, metadata.ScopesSupported, "openid") assert.Contains(t, metadata.ScopesSupported, "openid")
assert.Contains(t, metadata.ScopesSupported, "v1:document:read") assert.Contains(t, metadata.ScopesSupported, "v1:document")
assert.NotContains(t, metadata.ScopesSupported, "v1:document:read")
assert.NotContains(t, metadata.ScopesSupported, "profile") assert.NotContains(t, metadata.ScopesSupported, "profile")
} }

View File

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ type ProtectedResourceMetadata struct {
func NewProtectedResourceMetadata( func NewProtectedResourceMetadata(
resource uri.URI, resource uri.URI,
authorizationServer uri.URI, authorizationServer uri.URI,
registeredScopes []coredata.OAuth2Scope, writeScopes []coredata.OAuth2Scope,
) *ProtectedResourceMetadata { ) *ProtectedResourceMetadata {
return &ProtectedResourceMetadata{ return &ProtectedResourceMetadata{
Resource: resource, Resource: resource,
@@ -39,6 +39,6 @@ func NewProtectedResourceMetadata(
BearerMethodsSupported: []string{ BearerMethodsSupported: []string{
"header", "header",
}, },
ScopesSupported: protectedResourceScopes(registeredScopes), ScopesSupported: protectedResourceScopes(writeScopes),
} }
} }

View File

@@ -32,19 +32,21 @@ func TestNewProtectedResourceMetadata(t *testing.T) {
reg := oauth2scope.NewRegistry().Register( reg := oauth2scope.NewRegistry().Register(
map[coredata.OAuth2Scope][]string{ map[coredata.OAuth2Scope][]string{
probo.ScopeV1DocumentRead: {"core:document:get"}, probo.ScopeV1DocumentRead: {"core:document:get"},
probo.ScopeV1Document: {"core:document:create"},
}, },
) )
resource := uri.URI("https://app.example.com") resource := uri.URI("https://app.example.com")
authorizationServer := uri.URI("https://app.example.com") authorizationServer := uri.URI("https://app.example.com")
metadata := oauth2.NewProtectedResourceMetadata(resource, authorizationServer, reg.RegisteredScopes()) metadata := oauth2.NewProtectedResourceMetadata(resource, authorizationServer, reg.AllWriteScopes())
require.NotNil(t, metadata) require.NotNil(t, metadata)
assert.Equal(t, resource, metadata.Resource) assert.Equal(t, resource, metadata.Resource)
assert.Equal(t, []uri.URI{authorizationServer}, metadata.AuthorizationServers) assert.Equal(t, []uri.URI{authorizationServer}, metadata.AuthorizationServers)
assert.Equal(t, []string{"header"}, metadata.BearerMethodsSupported) assert.Equal(t, []string{"header"}, metadata.BearerMethodsSupported)
assert.Contains(t, metadata.ScopesSupported, oauth2.ScopeOpenID) assert.Contains(t, metadata.ScopesSupported, oauth2.ScopeOpenID)
assert.Contains(t, metadata.ScopesSupported, probo.ScopeV1DocumentRead) assert.Contains(t, metadata.ScopesSupported, probo.ScopeV1Document)
assert.NotContains(t, metadata.ScopesSupported, probo.ScopeV1DocumentRead)
assert.NotContains(t, metadata.ScopesSupported, oauth2.ScopeProfile) assert.NotContains(t, metadata.ScopesSupported, oauth2.ScopeProfile)
} }

View File

@@ -32,9 +32,9 @@ func authorizationServerScopes(registeredScopes []coredata.OAuth2Scope) []coreda
) )
} }
func protectedResourceScopes(registeredScopes []coredata.OAuth2Scope) []coredata.OAuth2Scope { func protectedResourceScopes(writeScopes []coredata.OAuth2Scope) []coredata.OAuth2Scope {
return slices.Concat( return slices.Concat(
[]coredata.OAuth2Scope{ScopeOpenID}, []coredata.OAuth2Scope{ScopeOpenID},
registeredScopes, writeScopes,
) )
} }

View File

@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ func (s *Service) OAuth2ServerMetadata(endpoints oauth2.Endpoints) *oauth2.Serve
// OAuth2ProtectedResourceMetadata returns the RFC 9728 protected resource metadata document. // OAuth2ProtectedResourceMetadata returns the RFC 9728 protected resource metadata document.
func (s *Service) OAuth2ProtectedResourceMetadata(resource uri.URI) *oauth2.ProtectedResourceMetadata { func (s *Service) OAuth2ProtectedResourceMetadata(resource uri.URI) *oauth2.ProtectedResourceMetadata {
return oauth2.NewProtectedResourceMetadata(resource, resource, s.OAuth2ScopeRegistry.RegisteredScopes()) return oauth2.NewProtectedResourceMetadata(resource, resource, s.OAuth2ScopeRegistry.AllWriteScopes())
} }
func (s *Service) IsSignUpEnabled() bool { func (s *Service) IsSignUpEnabled() bool {