Confine trust center reads and signatures to the page's tenant
The public trust API derived its authorization scope from client-supplied global IDs, so a visitor on one trust center could resolve nodes, export audit-report PDFs, and read or mutate electronic signatures belonging to another organization (cross-tenant access). Every trust API resolver now derives its scope from the active compliance page's organization via compliancepage.ScopeFromContext, so reads are always confined to the page's tenant. Cross-tenant or unknown IDs surface as not-found instead of leaking data or returning a 500. Active/presence is enforced upstream by the id and presence middlewares. esign's signature operations (GetSignatureByID, AcceptSignature, RecordEvent) now take a caller-provided scope instead of deriving one from the requested ID, so signature reads and mutations are tenant-scoped at the source. This removes the need for a resolver-level authorization helper; RecordEvent also verifies signature ownership within scope before recording, since the event foreign key is not tenant-composite. Adds e2e non-regression tests covering owning vs. foreign trust center report export and the generic node(id:) resolver. Signed-off-by: Sacha Al Himdani <sacha@probo.com>
This commit is contained in:
Sacha Al Himdani
234
e2e/trust/trust_center_report_export_test.go
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234
e2e/trust/trust_center_report_export_test.go
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// Copyright (c) 2026 Probo Inc <hello@probo.com>.
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//
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// Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
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// purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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// copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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//
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// THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH
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// REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
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// AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT,
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// INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM
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// LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR
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// OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
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// PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
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package trust_test
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import (
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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"go.probo.inc/probo/e2e/internal/factory"
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"go.probo.inc/probo/e2e/internal/testutil"
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)
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const exportReportPDFMutation = `
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mutation ExportReportPDF($input: ExportReportPDFInput!) {
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exportReportPDF(input: $input) {
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data
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}
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}
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`
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const nodeQuery = `
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query Node($id: ID!) {
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node(id: $id) {
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__typename
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}
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}
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`
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// TestTrustCenter_ExportReportPDF_TenantIsolation verifies that a public
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// audit-report PDF can only be exported through its own organization's trust
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// center. A visitor on another organization's trust center must not be able to
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// download it by supplying the foreign report GID (cross-tenant IDOR).
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func TestTrustCenter_ExportReportPDF_TenantIsolation(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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victimOwner := testutil.NewClient(t, testutil.RoleOwner)
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attackerOwner := testutil.NewClient(t, testutil.RoleOwner)
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victimTrustCenterID, victimReportID := setupPublicAuditReport(t, victimOwner)
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attackerTrustCenterID, _ := setupPublicAuditReport(t, attackerOwner)
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t.Run("owning trust center can export its report", func(t *testing.T) {
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var result struct {
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ExportReportPDF struct {
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Data string `json:"data"`
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} `json:"exportReportPDF"`
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}
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err := victimOwner.ExecuteTrust(victimTrustCenterID, exportReportPDFMutation, map[string]any{
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"input": map[string]any{"reportId": victimReportID},
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}, &result)
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require.NoError(t, err, "the owning trust center must serve its own public report")
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assert.True(
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t,
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strings.HasPrefix(result.ExportReportPDF.Data, "data:application/pdf;base64,"),
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"expected a base64 PDF data URL, got %q",
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result.ExportReportPDF.Data,
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)
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})
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t.Run("foreign trust center cannot export another org's report", func(t *testing.T) {
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err := attackerOwner.ExecuteTrust(attackerTrustCenterID, exportReportPDFMutation, map[string]any{
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"input": map[string]any{"reportId": victimReportID},
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}, nil)
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require.Error(t, err, "a foreign trust center must not export another org's report")
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assert.Contains(
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t,
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err.Error(),
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"not found",
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"cross-tenant report GID must be rejected as not found",
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)
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})
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}
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// TestTrustCenter_Node_TenantIsolation exercises the generic node(id:) resolver:
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// a visitor on one organization's trust center must not resolve a node that
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// belongs to another organization, even with a valid foreign GID.
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func TestTrustCenter_Node_TenantIsolation(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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victimOwner := testutil.NewClient(t, testutil.RoleOwner)
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attackerOwner := testutil.NewClient(t, testutil.RoleOwner)
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victimTrustCenterID, _ := setupPublicAuditReport(t, victimOwner)
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attackerTrustCenterID, _ := setupPublicAuditReport(t, attackerOwner)
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t.Run("owning trust center resolves its own node", func(t *testing.T) {
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var result struct {
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Node struct {
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Typename string `json:"__typename"`
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} `json:"node"`
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}
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err := victimOwner.ExecuteTrust(victimTrustCenterID, nodeQuery, map[string]any{
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"id": victimTrustCenterID,
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}, &result)
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require.NoError(t, err, "the owning trust center must resolve its own node")
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assert.NotEmpty(t, result.Node.Typename, "expected the node to resolve to a concrete type")
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})
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t.Run("foreign trust center cannot resolve another org's node", func(t *testing.T) {
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err := attackerOwner.ExecuteTrust(attackerTrustCenterID, nodeQuery, map[string]any{
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"id": victimTrustCenterID,
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}, nil)
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require.Error(t, err, "a foreign trust center must not resolve another org's node")
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assert.Contains(
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t,
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err.Error(),
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"not found",
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"cross-tenant GID must be rejected as not found",
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)
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})
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}
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// setupPublicAuditReport creates an audit with an uploaded report file, marks it
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// as publicly visible on the trust center, activates the trust center, and
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// returns the trust center ID and the report file ID.
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func setupPublicAuditReport(t *testing.T, owner *testutil.Client) (trustCenterID string, reportID string) {
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t.Helper()
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frameworkID := factory.NewFramework(owner).WithName(factory.SafeName("Framework")).Create()
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auditID := factory.NewAudit(owner, frameworkID).WithName(factory.SafeName("Audit")).Create()
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const uploadMutation = `
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mutation UploadAuditReport($input: UploadAuditReportInput!) {
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uploadAuditReport(input: $input) {
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audit {
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reportFile { id }
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}
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}
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}
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`
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pdfContent := []byte("%PDF-1.4\n1 0 obj\n<< /Type /Catalog >>\nendobj\ntrailer\n<< /Root 1 0 R >>\n%%EOF")
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var uploadResult struct {
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UploadAuditReport struct {
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Audit struct {
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ReportFile struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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} `json:"reportFile"`
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} `json:"audit"`
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} `json:"uploadAuditReport"`
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}
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err := owner.ExecuteWithFile(uploadMutation, map[string]any{
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"input": map[string]any{
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"auditId": auditID,
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"file": nil,
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},
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}, "input.file", testutil.UploadFile{
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Filename: "audit-report.pdf",
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ContentType: "application/pdf",
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Content: pdfContent,
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}, &uploadResult)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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reportID = uploadResult.UploadAuditReport.Audit.ReportFile.ID
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require.NotEmpty(t, reportID)
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const setVisibilityMutation = `
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mutation UpdateAudit($input: UpdateAuditInput!) {
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updateAudit(input: $input) {
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audit { id }
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}
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}
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`
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err = owner.Execute(setVisibilityMutation, map[string]any{
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"input": map[string]any{
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"id": auditID,
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"trustCenterVisibility": "PUBLIC",
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},
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}, nil)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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const trustCenterQuery = `
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query($organizationId: ID!) {
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node(id: $organizationId) {
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... on Organization {
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trustCenter { id }
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}
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}
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}
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`
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var trustCenterLookup struct {
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Node struct {
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TrustCenter struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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} `json:"trustCenter"`
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} `json:"node"`
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}
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err = owner.Execute(trustCenterQuery, map[string]any{
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"organizationId": owner.GetOrganizationID().String(),
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}, &trustCenterLookup)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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trustCenterID = trustCenterLookup.Node.TrustCenter.ID
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require.NotEmpty(t, trustCenterID)
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const activateMutation = `
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mutation($input: UpdateTrustCenterInput!) {
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updateTrustCenter(input: $input) {
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trustCenter { id active }
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}
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}
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`
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err = owner.Execute(activateMutation, map[string]any{
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"input": map[string]any{
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"trustCenterId": trustCenterID,
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"active": true,
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},
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}, nil)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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return trustCenterID, reportID
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}
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